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ABSTRACT

A structural analysis of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) explores the
organizational dynamics of such social movement organizations (SMOs) and
contributes to the generalizability of a core species concept of
organizations.
Kreps' core species concept of organization and Gamson's
previous research on protest groups provide the underpinnings for this
focus on SMOs as instances of organization.
Kreps specifies four
elements --domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities
(A)--which are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for
organization to exist.
The following analysis focuses on the series of
changes in the values of these elements--the chains of
restructurings --which comprise the histories of CORE and SNCC.
The
relationships between these organizational changes, the achievement of
success, and other organizational variables are also explored.
Findings
from the current work are compared to the findings from previous
research using Kreps' theory in order to evaluate the generalizability
of Kreps' work.
Findings for CORE and SNCC uncover a similar sequence of
restructurings over the life histories of these social movement
organizations.
Additional similarities between the groups suggest that
earlier restructurings take longer to complete, are more tranquile and
are associated with relative prosperity.
The achievement of success is
associated with more extensive restructurings, changes which arise from
nonconflictual catalysts, and periods of relative prosperity.
Similar
findings for coterminous time periods suggest the need for future
research in order to isolate truly organizational patterns from broader
societal influences.
Similarities between SMO findings and previous
non-SMO conclusions point to the generalizability of Kreps' theory of
social structure.

ORGANIZATION AS PROCESS:
THE LIFE HISTORIES OF CORE AND SNCC

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Analyses of social movement organizations (SMOs) have generated a
plethora of competing and complementary theories.

For the most part,

these attempts to understand SMOs have looked at them as atypical
entities which need to be understood in terms of their social
psychological dimensions (Miller, 1986), or the underlying plausability
and requisites of their existence (Oberschall, 1973;
1977) .

Even those

McCarthy and Zald,

analyses which have attempted to look at them as

groups per se have

frequently focused on the unique aspects of protest

groups rather than

on the underlying recognition of them as forms of

organization (Zald

and Ash, 1966;

Oberschall, 1979;

Garason, 1975).

A

potentially fruitful approach in studying these movement organizations
is to view them not as unique entities somehow divorced from other more
standard organizations, but rather as expressions of that social

form we

call organization, but about which we actually know very little. By
analyzing SMOs according to a general theory of social structure, the
research reported here attempts to illuminate the organizational
dynamics of SMOs and contribute to the refinement and generalizability
of a core species concept of organization.
The current work will focus on social movement organizations --or
more specifically on the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)--as instances of
2

organization.

But, as is so intuitively apparent in such groups,

organization cannot be conceived as static or absolute;

rather it must

be seen as both extant entity and continuously evolving process (Kreps,
1985a).

SNCC and CORE are definable units, but they are also units that

change and evolve during their life histories.

If we are going to grasp

how these organizations change in a very specific way, it is necessary
to move beyond broad assertions that they do change to very precise
desciptions of how, when, and under what circumstances such changes
occur.
In analyzing SMOs as organizations sui generis, several questions
need to be answered.

First, how can organization be captured accurately

and precisely enough to delineate both its aspects of consistency along
with its changes, transformations, and fluctuations?

Then, if such

structural components can be captured, can we trace this history of
consistency and change in a way that meaningfully and validly captures
the history of a specific SMO?

Third, assuming the above questions can

be addressed adequately, precisely how do SMOs change over time?
Fourth, is there any apparent patterning in these changes with regard to
exogenous and endogenous variables?

And if there are some discernible

patterns, are they evident only within a single SMO's history or do they
hold true across SMOs?

Sixth, do these changes in any way appear to be

related to the achievement of successes by the group?

And finally, do

the findings on SMOs appear to apply only to these protest groups, or
are there findings that would suggest uniformities for organizations in
general rather than just SMOs in particular?

The current research seeks

to answer these questions through a historical comparative analysis of
CORE and SNCC.

The analysis is built upon a core species concept of

organization formulated by Kreps (1985a, 1985b) and previous analysis of
protest groups by Gamson (1975).

Very brief synopses of the histories

of CORE and SNCC provide an orientation to the substantive focus of this
research before outlining the theoretical underpinnings in Kreps and
Gamson.
CORE was founded in Chicago in the early 1940's.

Throughout the

1940's and '50's the organization engaged in small-scale nonviolent
direct action against segregated public accommodations.

With the onset

of the 1960's and the Freedom Rides, CORE began a period of rapid growth
and change.

It expanded both its size and focus by becoming involved in

voter registration, focusing on the more subtle forms of discrimination
in housing and employment, and looking beyond integration to the
problems of the black poor.

From the onset of serious financial

problems by the Spring of 1964 until the current analysis ends with the
ascension of Roy Innis in 1968, CORE shifted its emphasis even further
to community organizing and Black Power.
SNCC was started in 1960 as an attempt to coordinate the various
campus protests that proliferated following the Greensboro sit-ins.
While the focus of the organization was originally to coordinate direct
action protests against segregation, SNCC very shortly changed its
emphasis to voter registration and community organizing in the Deep
South.

The summer of 1964 marks one of SNCC's most famous

endeavors --Freedom Summer--and also the beginning of its decline.

On

the path to its virtual dissolution in 1969, SNCC moved its focus to the
cities (with a corresponding abandonment of its previous rural
projects),

set off the wave of Black Power rhetoric, and formally

excluded whites--all of which served to create internal friction and

further isolate the group.

KREPS' CORE SPECIES CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION

Kreps' theory of social structure evolved from both grappling with
the metatheoretical questions of action and order in social phenomena
(Alexander, 1982) and an empirical mining of the Disaster Research
Center's archives on community responses to natural disasters.

All

previous works building on Kreps' theory (Francis and Kreps, 1984;
Kreps, 1985a, 1985b;
1986;

Bosworth and Kreps, 1986;

Saunders and Kreps,

Linn, 1986) have focused on the circumscribed temporal and

spatial parameters of community responses to natural disasters.

The

present analysis of SNCC and CORE seeks to illustrate both the
applicability of Kreps' theory in a non-disaster setting and, at the
same time, to utilize this theory to examine a neglected aspect of
social movement organizations--the dynamics of the organization itself.
Kreps delineates a taxonomy of structural forms from four core
elements of organization:
activities (A).

domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and

Employed as a structural code, the elements capture

empirically both the origins of new organizations and the
transformations of existing ones.

As expressed in Kreps' work,

organization is posited as an paradox:
which is constantly changing;
exists.

it exists as a definable entity

but the change is constrained by what

In effect, organization must be described as unit and process

s imultane ously.
The four elements are defined as follows (Bosworth and Kreps,
1986):

Domains are collective representations of bounded units and
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TABLE 1
Taxonomy of Sixty-four Forms of Association
One
Element
Forms

Two
Element
Forms

Three
Element
Forms

Four
Element
Forms

D
T
R
A

D-T
D-R
D-A
T-R
T-A
T-D
R-A
R-D
R-T
A-D
A-T
A-R

D-T-R
D-T-A
D-R-A
D-R-T
D-A-T
D-A-R
T-R-A
T-R-D
T-A-D
T-A-R
T-D-R
T-D-A
R-A-D
R-A-T
R-D-T
R-D-A
R-T-D
R-T-A
A-D-T
A-D-R
A-T-D
A-T-R
A-R-D
A-R-T

D-T-R-A
D-T-A-R
D-R-A-T
D-R-T-A
D-A-T-R
D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-R-D-A
T-A-D-R
T-A-R-D
T-D-R-A
T-D-A-R
R-A-D-T
R-A-T-D
R-D-T-A
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
R-T-A-D
A-D-T-R
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T
A-R-T-D

4

12

Total Forms of Association = 64

24

24

their reason for being.

Tasks are collective representations of a

division of labor for the enactment of human activities.

Resources

refer to individual capacities and collective technologies.

And

activities are the conjoined actions of individuals and social units.
By arranging the four elements in all logically possible combinations
and permutations, a taxonomy of sixty-four alternative forms of social
structure is derived (Table 1).
The elements are individually necessary and collectively sufficient
for organization to exist.

Thus only when all four elements are located

empirically has organization come into being.

With the quantitative

transition from a three- to a four-element form, a corresponding change
of system states occurs--from origins to maintenance

The

maintenance system state is synonymous with organization.

This system

state involves various transformations of the elements until the
organization goes out of existence.

It is this period during which

organization exists, and more specifically the elemental changes during
this period, that are the focus of the following analysis of CORE and
SNCC.
Restructuring
A dialectical view of organization as both process and unit demands
that each of the four elements (D,T,R, and A) has an empirically
tangible value.

At the same time, it requires that changes within these

values be documented.

Restructuring is the term used to refer to

instances of change in an organization's elemental values.

An

organization can undergo any number of these changes during the
maintenance system state.

It is the chronology of these

transformations--the chains of restructurings--that comprises the

history of an organization.

Delineating specific changes within the

organization gets at the dialectical relationship between existing unit
and continuously evolving process.
Restructuring occurs with a change in the value of one or more of
the elements once they are all in place.

Theoretically any

restructuring affects all of the elements to some degree.

However,

in

locating changes empirically, some of the elements do not change a
perceptible amount.

These thresholds of observability,

imprecise though

they are, serve as the guide for determining the form of each
restructuring.

A restructuring can display any of the sixty-four

logically possible configurations of the elements (see Table 1), which
are referred to as alternative forms of restructuring.

The letters

represent which of the four elements change, and the order of the
letters indicates the temporal sequence of this change.
In addition to pointing to the dialectic of process and unit, the
detailing of specific forms of restructuring points even more directly
to the dialectical relationship between the means and the ends of
organization.

Activities (A) and resources (R) refer most explicitly to

the means of organization, while domains (D) and tasks (T) refer to its
ends.

In means-based restructurings the organization's activities and

usable resources are altered within relatively fixed collective
representations of the group's focus and division of labor.
restructurings,

Ends-based

in turn, are changes in the collective representations

of the organization's focus and division of labor in conjunction with
relatively unchanging resources and activities.

In means-based

restructurings participants are changing what they are doing or what
they have to work with before (or without) a change in the
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organization's ends.

In ends-based restructurings the collective

representations associated with the organization are altered before (or
without) a change in the organization’s means.

Ends-based restructuring

points to the participant as actor, manipulating the organization
itself;

while means-based restructuring suggests the participant as

object, working within established organizational boundaries.
A dialectical approach implies some balancing of both types of
restructuring during a social movement organization's life history.
While ends-based restructuring allows for greater flexibility,

it also

opens the possibility of uncertainty and confusion about the
organization's goals and operation.

On the other hand, means-based

restructuring offers greater direction with its relatively stable ends,
but it can produce an inflexibility that is detrimental in a rapidly
changing environment.

It is posited that the viability of a social

movement organization, or of any organization, hinges on a balance or
interplay between means-based and ends-based changes.
Delineating changes in each of the elements involves judgment,
since discriminating thresholds are not explicit at this point.

Looking

at domains, tasks, resources, and activities in terms of social
movements rather than disasters suggests the following representative
examples of each element.
Activities refer to the types and amount of conjoined action
carried out by CORE'S or SNCC's constituency (i.e.
attracts to work for its cause).

the people the group

A restructuring of activities can

indicate a significant increase or decrease in the amount of a
particular activity, the commencement of a new type of activity, or the
termination of an extant endeavor.

An increase in the intensity and
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quantity of voter registration drives, a circumscribed change in
activities such as the Freedom Rides, and a progressive radicalization
of protest activities by participants are all examples of changes in
activities.
Resources capture fluctuations in available money and the size and
composition of the staff or constituency.

A restructuring of resources

takes into account the degree of change given the extant resources in
addition to reflecting changes in absolute figures.

A decrease or

increase in contributions, CORE'S appointment of James Farmer as
national director, an increased number of supporters, or a decrease in
the dedication of SNCC's field staff are all considered to be
significant changes in usable resources.
Tasks reflect the division of labor within the organization.
Changes in the internal boundary delineations as seen in the creation of
new positions,

the reassignment of responsibilities, and changes in the

collective representations of who does what within the organization
would all be recorded as restructurings of the task structure.
Domains are collective representations of bounded units and their
reason for being.

"Bounded units" include the ideological and purposive

aspects of the organization (goals or legitimate focus) and the
geographic locus of its activities.

Both of these categories, though,

must be recognizable as collective representations to be considered as
components of the group's domain.

Domains detail boundary demarcations

involving the social world beyond the organization.

CORE'S inclusion of

the South, early SNCC's formal emphasis on voter registration and direct
action, CORE'S shift of emphasis beyond integration to the problems of
the black poor, and both groups'

invocation of Black Power are all
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examples of domain restructuring.
The following example of a three-element (D-R-A) restructuring in
SNCC illustrates the empirical delineation of these changes:
In September 1963 SNCC's executive committee committed the
organization to a shift in its voter registration campaign.
Before this
date SNCC's drive to register voters had centered around registering
black residents of the Deep South as qualified voters in accord with the
states' obscure and frustrating registration requirements.
The change
in September to a formal platform of "one man, one vote" (D) abandoned
the early more accomodating approach in favor of a belief that all
blacks, regardless of educational attainment, deserved the right to
vote.
As such it signified a change in what the organization saw as its
legitimate focus, not merely in what it was doing.
November's election
allowed SNCC to move beyond rhetoric to an implementation of its new
emphasis.
The proposed plan called for a SNCC-run and legally
unrecognized election to take place on election day so that black
Mississippians could demonstrate their desire to vote despite their
conspicuous scarcity on Mississippi's lists of registered voters.
Two
weeks before the election, approximately one hundred students recruited
from Yale and Stanford arrived to assist in the polling (R). On
election day in early November, the first Freedom Vote took place (A).
The turnout verified SNCC's claim that it was intimidation and
discriminatory registration guidelines rather than apathy that kept
Mississippi's black residents away from the legally sanctioned
elections.
Restructurings, then, are changes within an organization during its
maintenance period.

The empirical application of this concept in the

current work captures the series of changes--the chains of
restructurings--that compose the histories of CORE and SNCC.

As such it

is an analytical tool that allows detailed discussion of the process of
social movement organizations.

Not only is it possible to delineate the

chains of restructurings that constitute these organizations' histories,
but it is also possible to determine precisely which of the crucial
aspects of organization change in each instance.

Thus, we can document

dialectical tensions and patterns both within and across restructurings.
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GAMSON'S CATEGORIES OF SUCCESS

In addition to drawing on Kreps' work to analyze social movement
organizations, Gamson's (1975) analysis of social protest groups comes
into play.

Gamson's study analyzes a representative sample of

challenging groups in the United States between 1800 and 1945.

He

explores the permeability of a pluralistic society and finds influences
of organizational,

ideological, and operational variables on the groups'

chances of success.
For this analysis of CORE and SNCC, Gamson's work contributes to
the conceptualization of the achievement of success as an indicator of
effective response.

In Kreps' original work the criteria for deeming a

disaster-related organization successful was "need met, response
terminated."

For SMOs such a simple criterion does not capture the

essense of effective response.

Mere longevity is not a valid indicator

of an effective protest, and there is no "normal state," as in
disasters,

toward which the organization is striving to return.

An

operational conceptualization of success, then, provides a basis for
looking at the SMOs not merely as strings of restructurings, but also as
historical entities which attained various types and degrees of desired
change.

In short, it gives an indication of how well the groups did

what they set out to do.
Gamson proposes two heuristic categories of success--(1) acceptance
for the group itself as a legitimate spokesman for a constituency
(Gamson, 1975:31), and (2) gains in advantages for the intended
beneficiaries (Gamson, 1975:34).

Within the category of acceptance,

four specific types of such legitimacy are delineated:

consultation,
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negotiations, formal recognition, and inclusion.
an exchange of ideas initiated by the antagonist.

Consultation involves
Negotiations

must

occur between the challenging group and the antagonist on a continuous
basis, not just in times of crisis.

Formal recognition entails an

explicit (usually written) statement by the antagonist recognizing the
challenging group as a legitimate spokesman for the constituency.
Finally,

inclusion occurs when a member (or members) simultaneously

retains his membership in the challenging group and is placed in a
position of status or authority in the antagonist's organizational
structure.
The second major category of success--the gaining of new
advantages - -is achieved when a common good (Olson cited in Oberschall,
1975) is garnered for the SMO's beneficiary.

A common good is a benefit

that is distributed among all members of the group the SMO is attempting
to assist by its activities and program, not just those who actively
participate in the campaign for change.
Gamson scores each challenging group at the end of its protest
period with a series of pluses (+) and minuses (-) to derive a single
indicator of the group's level of success.

Because the current focus is

not only the overall levels of success for CORE and SNCC, but also the
relationship between restructurings and success, a modified system is
employed.

Rather than creating one final score which respresents the

group's level of success for its entire history,

each gain in either

acceptance or advantages for CORE or SNCC is recorded.

In the final

analysis, this results in a series of successes, which can then be
anayzed both in composite and individually with relation to relevant
restructurings.

14

Successes in the current sense are rather tangible
things--accomplishments that can be quantified or located in legal
edicts or formal meetings.

Increases in the number of registered voters

in the Deep South, desegregation of specific public accommodations,
legislation outlawing segregation in various facilities, a meeting with
a federal government official, or a preferential hiring agreement are
examples of gains which are recorded as instances of success.

METHODOLOGY

The analysis of CORE and SNCC incorporates an intertwining of both
qualitative and quantitative techniques.

The data for the qualitative

descriptions of the changes and successes in CORE and SNCC were garnered
primarily from existing histories by both professional historians and
participants in the organizations.

Original documents were used only

sparsely to fill in gaps or to clarify issues in the comprehensive
histories

2

.

A general chronology detailing the course of each

organization's history was created and augmented from the.various
sources.

Each entry in this chronology was then analyzed to determine

if it constituted a restructuring or an instance of success for the
group.

If it was deemed a significant restructuring or success,

the

form of the variable was determined and a detailed description was
recorded.
After reanalysis of the historical sources,

in an attempt to

accumulate an exhaustive list of restructurings and successes,

the

qualitative descriptions of each restructuring and success were
quantified to allow for statistical analyses (see Codebook, Appendix A ) .
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Due to the exploratory nature of this investigation, statistical
analyses focus on correlations among various aspects of restructuring,
success, and organizational characteristics at the time of each
restructuring or success.

These correlations indicate the direction and

magnitude of relationships among the central variables which suggest
tentative hypotheses about the dynamics and successes of social movement
organizations.

By retaining and incorporating the qualitative

descriptions which preceded this quantitative analysis, both the
mathematical precision of statistics and the descriptive validity of
qualitative data come together to give a more accurate depiction of the
organizations under scrutiny.

OVERVIEW OF FOLLOWING CHAPTERS

The following chapter details the chains of restructurings and
instances of success that comprise the histories of CORE and SNCC.
Historical narratives with detailed descriptions of several
restructurings in text provide an orientation to these histories and
more fully demonstrate the application of Kreps1 theory in the social
movement realm.

The narratives are augmented by Appendix B, which

provides complete chronologies,
restructurings and successes.

in list form, of both organizations’
Chapter two concludes with a detailed

critique of the application of Kreps'
area.

theory in this new substantive

Chapter three explores a more quantitative analysis of the

histories of CORE and SNCC.

It begins with a delineation of patterns in

the forms of restructurings,

timing of restructurings, and successes,

both within and between CORE and SNCC.

A transitional section
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introduces the central variables of the statistical analyses.

The

remaining portions of chapter three detail the various correlations
among these variables.
Kreps' theory.

Chapter four focuses on the generalizability of

The current findings on social movement organizations

are compared to previous disaster-related conclusions in an attempt to
identify commonalities which refer to organization, regardless of the
substantive context in which it occurs.

Concluding comments synthesize

the findings and offer cautions and directions for future studies.
Several boundary delineations and specifications must be kept in
mind throughout these following chapters.

The focus of the analysis of

CORE and SNCC is pointedly on social movement organizations as
organizations.

Therefore the following discussions focus on the

structural elements and variables associated with organization itself.
In an attempt to communicate precisely what a structural framework can
illuminate, non-organizational variables which may provide clarity or
explanation about historical occurrences will not formally enter the
study.

This leads to a second specification--the emphasis on

description rather than explanation.

This research seeks to explore the

sequences of changes and successes within CORE'S and SNCC's maintenance
system states.

It is concerned with a precise detailing of what

happened rather than with an explanation of why it occurred.

Finally,

the analysis of CORE and SNCC focuses on these groups as broad regional
or national entities.

It is the wholes, analytically distinct from

their sub-unit parts, which are the focal units of study.

The dual

attempt throughout is to shed light on the organizational dynamics of
social movement organizations and to assess the generalizability of
Kreps' core species concept of organization.

CHAPTER TWO
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF KREPS' THEORY: CORE AND SNCC

The following histories of CORE and SNCC convey the histories as
they are depicted in restructurings and successes.

These histories

include only the organizational details that can be captured by the
framework derived from Kreps' and Gamson's theories.

Additional

interpretive comments are withheld to avoid distorting or embellishing
the historical accounts that structural analysis can provide.

The

majority of restructurings are discussed simply as portions of a running
historical narrative.

However, representative restructurings are

delineated in more precise detail to illustrate the determination of
instances of restructuring in this historical context.

(See Appendix B

for complete chronologies of restructurings and successes in CORE and
SNCC.)

CORE: 1941 - 1968

The temporal sequence of CORE'S origins is best depicted by an
R-A-D-T sequence:
In October 1941 the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) founded a
"peace team" in Chicago.
The young members of this pacifist enclave met
for weekly discussions which often centered around the application of
Gandhian techniques to the racial issue (R). Cell members established
Fellowship House to challenge housing restrictions in Chicago, and in
March 1942 engaged in their first large scale direct action project
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against the segregated White City Roller Rink (A). Riding the
enthusiasm generated by the White City project, fifty people met in
April to form a "permanent interracial group committed to the use of
nonviolent direct action opposing discrimination" (D). This formalized
domain was externally legitimated by FOR1s agreement to retain James
Farmer on its payroll with a primary responsibility of establishing this
new group.
Between the summers of 1942 and 1943 a task structure
evolved which was composed of a set of committees and three action units
concerned with specific spheres of segregated facilities (T).
By 1943, then, all four elements were present and organization is
considered to exist.

At this early stage CORE was explicitly

interracial and nonviolent.

Among the small band of members, many were

pacifists and virtually all were college educated.
The new organization's first restructuring occurred in June 1943.
The domain (D) of the organization was extended beyond Chicago in a
federation of local units working to abolish the color line through
direct nonviolent action;

and the task structure (T) was redefined to

include a chairman and a combination secretary/treasurer, and to make
the relationship between the central office and the local units that of
a loose federation.
CORE showed a tendency throughout the 1940's toward restructuring
the ends of the organization.

More specifically, the task structure was

repeatedly restructured in an ongoing effort to more effectively
coordinate the local units' activities and to give more control to the
central office.

Two important exceptions to this trend were the

commencing of a national project as seen in the Journey of
Reconciliation and an explicit statement excluding communist-controlled
groups from CORE'S ranks.
The 1950's began on an unpromising note with activities,
membership, and income noticeably declining.

With a rather complex

restructuring in the summer of 1951 the task structure was altered to
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create the position of part-time fund raiser.

James Robinson filled

this position, and the active pursuit of funds increased.
restructuring,

in turn, served as a catalyst for a perceptible increase

in monetary resources by the summer of 1954.
decade,

This

In the latter half of the

the promotion of Robinson to executive secretary and the

beginning of interest and activities in the South were setting the
course for CORE'S tremendous growth in the '60's.
The Greensboro sit-ins of February 1960 served as an external
catalyst which sparked an A-T-R restructuring in CORE:
Almost immediately following the initial sit-ins CORE'S activities
broadened and increased.
The field workers intensified their efforts to
initiate new chapters in the South and to teach protesters proper
nonviolent techniques.
Activity in the North also surged with the
proliferation of sympathy protests (A).
Two months later, in April,
CORE altered its task structure to allow
for three additional field
secretary positions (bringing the total to five) under the leadership of
the newly created field director (T). At its annual convention in July,
CORE expanded this response to the new fervor in the South by recruiting
the help of student advisors to encourage ties between the student
movement and CORE.
It also shifted the bulk of its field workers and
funds to the campaigns in the South (R).
A change of leadership in early 1961 brought James Farmer to the
position of National Director.

One of Farmer's first undertakings in

his new position was a change in activities as seen in the resurgence of
a truly national project--the Freedom Rides:
The Freedom Rides were carried out to test compliance with the
Supreme Court's Boynton decision which prohibited segregation on
carriers and terminal facilities connected with interstate travel.
The
Rides were modeled on CORE'S Journey of Reconciliation during the
1940's, but the Rides of the 1960's were more daring in the plan to
penetrate the Deep South.
On May 4, 1961 CORE commenced the Freedom
Rides as an interracial group of thirteen people left Washington D.C.
on a bus headed South (A).
CORE'S segment of the Rides continued for
two w e eks.
This was a crucial undertaking for CORE and one which can be causally
linked to the September Interstate Commerce Commission order banning
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segregation in facilities connected with interstate travel (a success in
the form of advantages).

These Rides sparked enthusiasm for CORE's

programs and served as a catalyst for a change in resources as seen in
the commencement of an upward trend in membership during later 1961 and
into 1962.

As an answer to this growing size, CORE restructured and

augmented its task structure in an attempt to best coordinate and
accommodate this increased size.
Beginning in early 1962 CORE shifted its activities from rather
narrowly bounded civil rights issues and targets (in the form of public
accommodations) to the more general problems of housing and employment.
This shift and the increasing proportion of blacks (especially working
class blacks) joining the organization led finally, by the fall of 1963,
to a change in domain beyond integration to the problems of the black
poor.

As far as successes are concerned, the Route 40 Freedom Ride, the

following Freedom Highways campaign in the summer of 1962, and the
Sealtest preferential hiring agreement later in 1962 account for the
last major block of successes that can be attributed to the national
organization itself.
Martin Luther King's Birmingham campaign in May 1963 sparked new
interest in civil rights.

For CORE this increased publicity of an

external occurrence acted as a catalyst for an R-A restructuring:
Immediately following King's May campaign, CORE's useable resources
increased on all fronts.
People rushed to join the group while existing
members became more involved and active.
In addition, many non-members
participated in CORE's protests, making demonstrations and projects
larger than ever before.
The increases were not limited to human
resources, as contributions rose significantly in the aftermath of this
catalyst (R). By mid-summer, two months after the benchmark of a change
in resources, the number of direct action projects carried through by
CORE flourished.
Not only did the volume of protest increase, but its
character also shifted.
The formerly disciplined nonviolent
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demonstrations for integration were increasingly replaced by civil
disobedience by protesters who courted arrests and minimized the role of
negotiations (A).
By the following Spring the size and frequency of protests were
noticeably decreasing and direct action became a decreasingly important
activity.
A decline in contributions in the Spring of 1964 combined with a
standing history of overspending placed CORE quite firmly in debt.

By

late 1964 this financial difficulty had become urgent enough to
necessitate an additional transformation of resources--securing loans,
closing down some offices, and streamlining the field staff.

Following

the initial set-back in usable money in early 1964, CORE focused direct
and singular attention on its ends for the first time since the 1950's
and created Regional Action Councils in yet another attempt to
reorganize its task structure to more effectively coordinate its parts.
During the ensuing year CORE changed both its activities and its
domain to incorporate partisan politics.

This period during late 1964

also witnessed the increasing importance of community organizing--first
as an activity and then as a formalized domain.

By September of 1965

this trend was so pronounced that the previous emphasis on voter
registration was virtually abandoned as this concentration on community
organizing around the felt-needs of the community came to dominate
activities.
From the 1965 annual convention until I stop tracing the
organization in 1968, CORE progressively edged toward a more radical and
exclusively black focus.

At the 1965 convention the long-debated

question of the role of whites in the organization was finally formally
addressed with a specification of tasks which decreed "members of the
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minority community shall substantially constitute the leadership of the
chapters."

The gradual dwindling of finances and constituency allowed

long-subverted criticisms of Farmer to surface, finally resulting in a
change of leadership to Floyd McKissick in January 1966.

Controversy

surrounding the selection of McKissick created further friction and a
substantial number of resignations by key staff members.
The pronouncement of Black Power, a dismissal of the standing
commitment to nonviolence, and an anti-war pronouncement at the 1966
convention formalized the continuing trend toward separatism and
radicalism.

Almost instantly this extensive change in domain led to a

significant drop in contributions and the loss of most remaining white
supporters.

The trend toward black exclusivity was even more fully

articulated at the 1968 convention with the change in leadership from
McKissick to Roy Innis, an explicit transition in domain from civil
rights to black nationalism and an accompanying formal exclusion of
whites, and a transformation of the task structure to a much smaller
more centralized staff.

Although CORE limped along into the early

1970's, at this point in 1968 it seems to have made a sufficient break
with its past to consider the original CORE defunct, and my analysis
ends .

SNCC: 1960 - 1969

The origins of SNCC can be characterized as a D-R-T-A form:
An invitation sent by the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference's Ella Baker succeeded in bringing together two hundred
representatives from Southern college protest groups to coordinate their
disparate projects.
At this founding meeting in April 1960, the
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representatives adopted a religious and philosophical treaty on
nonviolence as their statement of purpose and agreed that the group
should coordinate communications between local groups (D). In June a
temporary office worker was hired to oversee the newly donated corner of
SCLC's Atlanta office (R). At its October meeting the group created a
formal task structure.
The coordinating committee was to include one
representative from each of the sixteen Southern states and the District
of Columbia.
Local groups would still be autonomous, and each member of
the coordinating committee was authorized to speak on behalf of the
group (T). The coordinating committee was relatively inactive until
February 1961.
At this point, eleven months after origins began, SNCC
responded to pleas for assistance from students in the Rock Hill jail-in
by sending representatives to join the demonstration (A).
Shortly after organization was achieved in February 1961, SNCC members
were invited to a meeting with President Kennedy to discuss voter
registration.

This meeting (to which CORE leaders and other major civil

rights leaders also were invited) constitutes an instance of
consultation--a type of acceptance within Gamson's categories of
success.
Unlike CORE, which formally excluded communists from the
organization, SNCC's first restructuring involved its assertion of free
association in conjunction with its acceptance of a grant from the
Southern Conference Educational Fund.

Also during the summer of 1961,

SNCC began the transition from a coordinating committee to a field-based
organization with the creation of a field worker position which was
filled by Charles Sherrod.

Later in the summer Bob Moses and two

volunteers began voter registration efforts in Mississippi.

This area

of activity was formalized in August in the compromise which created
both direct action and voter registration wings, with accompanying
changes in tasks, activities, and resources.
Publicity of Bob Moses and his co-workers' activities is regarded
as the catalyst which preceded a complex (R-D-A-T) restructuring in the
Fall of 1961:
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Twelve students decided to drop out of college to work full-time
for SNCC (R). A month later at the October staff meeting, the March on
Mississippi was adopted as the focus of SNCC's activities to be carried
through by this new full-time contingent.
By adopting this campaign,
SNCC refocused its scope of influence by recognizing the Deep South
rather than college campuses of the entire South as its legitimate locus
of activities (D). Very shortly after this reformulation of SNCC's
focus, field workers began to shift their activities from the rather
narrowly delimited areas of direct action and voter registration to the
more general emphasis on community organizing in the black communities
of Mississippi (A). With this addition of new staff, the change in
domain, and the more diffuse activities directed at bringing communities
together to realize their own potential, SNCC's center of power shifted
(T). The coordinating committee became merely the titular head of the
group.
After this Fall it was the actions of the field staff rather
than the decisions of the coordinating committee that formulated SNCC's
policy.
Throughout SNCC's history there was an unresolved tension between
members who abhorred any suggestion of creating internal hierarchies or
bureaucracy and those who felt that SNCC needed some type of formal
organizational configuration to be effective and durable.

By late 1961

Jim Forman, SNCC's new executive secretary and a strong advocate of this
latter view, began pushing for more organizational structure within
SNCC.

During the ensuing year or so the task structure was modified to

include a set of specialized jobs in public relations and coordination.
Strategic resources were augmented when key people were introduced to
fill these positions.
Another facet of this protracted debate about the internal
organization of SNCC itself was the related issue of SNCC's role with
relation to the local communities in which it worked.

On this question,

SNCC formally specified very early that local leadership should be
encouraged regardless of the more finely honed organization or
communication skills of the more formally educated SNCC members.

This

simple declaration did not avert all conflicts, however, especially with
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the influx of white volunteers during and after Freedom Summer.
By the spring of 1962 there was a discernible trend toward a more
radical staff.

New SNCC members were likely to be radicalized and

involved in the civil rights movement before they joined SNCC.
Simultaneously, current members were quickly becoming radicalized by
their harsh experiences in the Deep South--leading overall to an
increasingly radical band of workers.
SNCC had carved a niche for itself in the most inauspicious of
territorial domains--the Deep South.

When Voter Education Project funds

were allocated in the sumer of 1962, they were distributed on the basis
of anticipated success in voter registration drives.
received very limited support.

SNCC therefore

To augment this sum, SNCC adjusted its

domain to focus its fund raising activities in the North and
restructured resources by hiring white staff members to man these
offices.

By the end of the year these northern efforts produced a

significant increase in income so that SNCC ended the year out of debt.
In addition to strictly financial support, these northern affiliates
also provided donations that made it possible for SNCC to successfully
carry out additional peripheral activities such as the LeFlore County
food drive in late 1962.
By the summer of 1963 SNCC had made some significant gains in voter
registration (a success in the form of advantages).

However it was the

relative insignificance of these gains compared to the enormity of the
work that needed to be done, rather than the achievement itself, that
affected SNCC's future course.

In response to this dubious success,

SNCC carried out the restructuring detailed in Chapter One by shifting
to a "one man, one vote" doctrine and program.
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During the Spring of 1964 SNCC expanded its activities in the North
in a successful effort to raise funds and foster alliances for its
proposed summer project--Freedom Summer.

This summer itself is

expressed as an R-A restructuring:
Freedom Summer was a plan to recruit Northern college students to
spend their summer working with black residents of rural Mississippi.
Beginning in May SNCC underwent a shifting and augmenting of resources.
The organization shifted the bulk of its resources away from its more
dispersed projects and into the Freedom Summer jurisdictions in
Mississippi.
The augmentation of resources included the arrival of
Northern volunteers beginning in June (R). With this influx of a large
number of highly educated volunteers, SNCC diversified and expanded its
activities.
Existing activities such as voter registration were
magnified.
In addition new activities such as Freedom Schools, which
sought to supplement local black's inadequate public education, were
implemented (A). This change in resources and activities continued, as
anticipated, throughout the summer.
During this time SNCC was in an interesting and uncertain
organizational state.

While it was definitely in existence (although

arguably as a one- to three-element form rather than an organization),
its primary activities were carried out under the auspices of the
Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) and the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP).

It was under these two banners that SNCC's

successes of this summer of 1964 occurred.

First, SNCC (COFO) managed

to register, either as bona fide voters or as MFDP voters, a sizeable
number of Mississippians (success--advantages).

Second, the MFDP

challenge at Atlantic City can be seen as inclusion, a form of
acceptance.

Like its previous gain in voter registration, however,

these successes were viewed by outsiders, rather than by SNCC, as
meaningful changes ^ .
In September 1964 SNCC encountered another restructuring as a
result of Freedom Summer.
When SNCC recruited the Northern volunteers
for the summer project it was anticipated and expected that they would
depart when the summer was over. At the conclusion of the project,
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though, approximately eighty of these summer volunteers chose to remain
in Mississippi to become full-time SNCC workers instead of returning to
school (R). This unanticipated retention of a sizeable white
constituency in SNCC's full-time staff radically altered the
organization's racial composition.
It also compounded the simmering
question of the role of whites in SNCC.
After Freedom Summer SNCC began to lose the support and financial
backing of northern liberals, and the performance and reliability of its
staff waned.

In this "freedom high" period many projects fell apart and

were terminated due to a lack of dependable staff.

Similar to the

occurrence in CORE, this set-back in usable resources was followed by a
singular restructuring of the task structure--the first such
concentrated focus on ends in nearly three years.

This trend of

declining income and increasingly uncommitted staff was marked by a
virtual end of institutional support by the end of 1965 and another
series of office closings due to inactive staff in the summer of 1966.
A contested election in May 1966 brought Stokely Carmichael in as
chairman and created a secretariat of members who favored greater
militance.

This tendency toward greater militance was soon proclaimed

to the nation in Carmichael's infamous and inflammatory (but imprecise)
change in domain to Black Power.
In addition to its proclamation of Black Power, SNCC shifted and
broadened its scope by focusing on international events.

As early as

1964 and throughout 1966-67 members made both SNCC-authorized and
unauthorized visits to African and other foreign nations.

The

incorporation of an anti-war stance through a written denunciation of
U.S.

involvement in Vietnam in January 1966 was SNCC's first official

venture outside of explicitly domestic racial issues.

By May 1967 with

Rap Brown's ascension to chairman, the group proclaimed itself to be a
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human rights organization and formally set up an international affairs
commission.

A final involvement in international events served as a

catalyst to further alienate SNCC from its remaining white supporters.
A pro-Palestinian article authored by a SNCC member was interpreted by
readers as a reflection of SNCC's formal position on the Mid-East
conflict and caused a substantial drop in the already dwindling
contributions.
As early as the first half of 1965, SNCC began activities in urban
areas in conjunction with Julian Bond's campaign for the Georgia House
of Representatives.

However it was not until the fall of 1966 that this

transition was definite, as urban areas, rather than the rural Deep
South, became SNCC's legitimate domain.

A gradual shift of staff to

cities of the North (in addition to some cities in the South) could, by
this date, be considered a definite redefinition of the organization's
reason for being.

With this transition to urban areas, the previous

projects and communities of the rural Deep South were virtually
abandoned.
By this point SNCC was crumbling both internally and externally.
Chairman Rap Brown's preoccupation with his own legal entanglements
meant that SNCC had a very visible but ineffectual chairman.

With

Brown's resignation in June 1968 SNCC reconstituted its central
structure to appoint nine deputy chairmen.

Internal bickering escalated

as SNCC declined, and during 1968 two distinct firings--Carmichael in
June and Sellers and Ricks in December--were evidence of the critical
evaluations of the old members by the newer SNCC people and of a
last-ditch attempt to rid the organization of those people who were seen
as responsible for its decline.
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Finally in June 1969 Rap Brown and a band of followers demanded
control of the organization which they redefined as a paramilitary unit.
With this usurpation Forman, a remaining vestige of "old SNCC,"
resigned.

The revised SNCC was nominally headed by Brown but controlled

by the Revolutionary Political Council.
for several more years;
Coordinating Committee,

Like CORE, SNCC straggled on

but with a renaming as the Student National
it was sufficiently divorced from its

predecessor to consider my analysis complete.

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF KREPS' THEORY

The narratives above, in conjunction with the detailed accounts of
several restructurings in text and the chronologies provided in Appendix
B, demonstrate that Kreps' theory can capture much of what constitutes
the histories of CORE and SNCC.

Before proceeding to the actual

analysis of these relationships among the separate variables, I am going
to conclude this chapter with a more detailed discussion of the specific
criteria and the difficulties associated with using Kreps1 theory in
such historical arenas.
In the switch from disasters to social movement organizations,
domain is the most difficult of Kreps' elements to translate.

Tasks as

an internal division of labor, resources as usable assets, and
activities as conjoined action translate fairly easily from
disaster-oriented definitions to social movement organizations.
Domains, however, are somewhat troublesome.

In disasters domains are

seen as the ends of organization which are expressed in both internal
and external legitimation.

In social movement organizations this
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concept of legitimation is much more difficult to grasp.
internal legitimation is tenuous;

At times

for my research such restructurings

were not characterized as changes in domain if internal legitimation was
unclear.
problems.

External legitimation, though, leads to a variety of difficult
Rarely is there written communication indicating what the

focus of the organization should be.

Also, there is rarely any formal

external acknowledgement, let alone support, of the groups' specific
sphere of influence.

If the distinctions to be made are simply, for

example, civil rights/beyond civil rights, these are rather clear.

But

CORE and SNCC are more intricate and subtle than these gross categories
would indicate, and a meaningful discussion of their patterns of
restructuring needs to capture more than such simple dichotomous
distinctions.
Since formal domains are so rarely specified, it becomes necessary
to make more subjective judgments than would be the ideal situation.
While formal recognition of a domain is rarely given positively,

it is

sometimes acknowledged through the condemnation of external sources.
This is particularly clear in the transition to Black Power.

Few

sources applauded the change, but many gave it legitimacy with their
denunciations.
legitimation.

For my purposes, such refutations constitute external
These responses are acknowledging the group's

collectively represented legitimate sphere of activity, despite the fact
that the external source does not agree with the propriety of such a
focus.
At other times it is difficult to get any reliable picture of how a
change is regarded externally.

In these cases the original positioning

of domains in the model as ends of organization must be foremost in the
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researcher's mind.

Take, for example, the transition that both CORE and

SNCC made to urban ghettos.

It is clearly not that they simply changed

their activities (means) to include techniques applicable in an urban
area.

Rather they came to see their legitimate focus as these ghettos

and their residents.

This is definitely a shift in their reason for

being, not simply in what they are doing.

Therefore, regardless of

formal legitimation, this change is seen as an adoption of a new domain.
This explains how I can state, in my analysis of SNCC, that it was
involved in urban activities in 1965 and early '66 but did not gain
urban areas as part of its domain until late in 1966.
attempts it changed only its activities.

In the early

Only later did it incorporate

urban areas as a sphere it specifically wanted to influence rather than
as just a particular arena for its activities.

A very elusive

distinction at times, but the strictest observance of means/ends
distinctions is necessary to capture accurately what is changed.

Are

the goals and focus changing, or is it merely a change in the actions
being employed and carried out?
A final question on determining domains:

if legitimation is

supposed to come from both internal and external sources, who are the
relevant others who can provide external legitimation?

In disasters

where formal recognition is much cleaner, this isn't terribly difficult
to ascertain.
tricky.

In social movement organizations,

it becomes rather

The group's antagonists are one possibility of relevant others.

These individuals or groups, though, often concentrate on the group as a
whole rather than on what the group and others perceive as its purpose.
They see the group in caricatured terms and often are quite oblivious to
its subtle (and even not so subtle) changes.
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For SNCC and CORE, the black population could be seen en masse as
the relevant others.

But then the question of what constitutes

legitimation becomes cloudy.

If any blacks follow a group in a certain

pursuit, does that become a legitimate domain of the organization?

This

criterion makes the distinction between activites and domains, or means
and ends, rather moot.

Ostensibly, a social movement organization

cannot carry out activities without some people joining it.

Therefore

all activities would become domains.
Another possibility is other similar social movement
organizations-- in these particular cases other civil rights groups.
For most restructurings this set of relevant others is a fairly good
source of external support or denunciation--either way giving external
validity to the fact that the group is now seen as having a specific
area in its legitimate domain, regardless of the externally perceived
legitimacy of the domain itself.
Once again the most important determination of domain is gained by
searching for the organization's members' collective representation of
what they should be doing (D) (in terms of legitimate focus, not in
moralistic terms) rather than just what they are doing (A).

While the

concept of external legitimation is important to see organization as an
open system, perhaps for organizations that are not working within
prescribed spheres, it is sufficient to view the concept of open system
as involving boundary delineations with the broader environment, while
closed system (tasks) involves only the inner workings of the
organization itself.
A few questions with regard to the restructurings themselves need
to be addressed.

First, how can separate restructurings be delineated?
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It is quite simple to say that analytically restructurings are separated
by temporal and/or spatial disjunctions and that between each
restructuring there is some configuration of the elements that can be
considered a normal or stable state of some defined length.
it is not this clear cut.

In reality

For in analyzing a national or regional

organization many things are apparently occurring simultaneously or in a
long chain of events that could perhaps be seen as a single
restructuring.

What becomes crucial in these distinctions between

separate restructurings are both discontinuities in time and/or space,
and unique identifiable catalysts to each restructuring.

Keeping these

three distinctions in mind makes delineations between most
restructurings fairly clear.

A unique value on any, not necessarily

all, of these criteria can be used to isolate a unique restructuring.
There are instances, though,

in which it is difficult to determine

if one restructuring ends and then this restructuring serves as a
catalyst for a second unique restructuring, or if both restructurings
are really part of one larger restructuring.

Again,

it is important to

look for discontinuities in time, space, and catalysts.

Cases in which

the organization seems to be at some sort of equilibrium between the
changes and with unique catalysts, are documented as separate
restructurings.

If, however, regardless of time breaks, an initial

change appears to be preparatory for an additional change and the
organization is not really, then, at rest between the two instances of
change, the restructuring is considered to be one larger restructuring.
This implies a common problem of historical research:

were the two

changes seen as united by the participants, or is their connection
apparent only in retrospect.
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Another problem in the determination of unique restructurings
occurs when a change in a single element leads to another change in the
same element.

For instance a change in R in the form of hiring new

fund-raisers, produces an increase in income (also R ) .
guidelines,

From the above

this may appear to be a single restructuring.

Here, though,

it is important to keep both theoretical and empirical distinctions in
mind--a change in R is a change in R, but a
change in money.

change in people is not a

If both the additional staff and the increase

in

income are considered to be individually significant changes, they
cannot be captured by recording a single change in R.

In these cases

the first change is regarded as a completed restructuring and then is
cited as the catalyst for the second change.
Moving out of the rather circumscribed time and space of disasters
also makes it increasingly difficult to focus on the relevant unit of
analysis.

CORE and SNCC are regional or national organizations which

are composed of smaller units of variously defined clarity and autonomy.
This is particularly relevant in CORE, where each local unit has its own
officers, funds, and individual projects.

Although I have not analyzed

them, I would suspect that New York CORE

or St.

matter, SNCC's Lowndes County activities

or Atlanta project are as

Louis CORE or, for that

analytically viable as organizations as CORE and SNCC themselves.

It

must be remembered, though, that just because New York CORE is involved
in employment campaigns, or Atlanta Project workers are vehemently
anti-white does not mean that an element in the larger organization's
configuration has restructured.

These are units within a larger unit,

and when the larger unit is the focus of analysis it must always be the
specific locus of restructurings.
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Focusing on a single unit of analysis is crucial to depict
accurately the structural configuration and changes of this given
entity.

At the same time, though, it necessarily oversimplifies the

dynamics of the entire organization (which includes these smaller
units).

It portrays an artificial sense of stability and linear change

that is frequently much more conflictual and chaotic in reality.
Elemental values in some component units may be ahead, behind, or in
actual conflict with the broader organization's values.However
difference is never recognized by the larger organization in
a restructuring,

if this
the form of

it will go unrecorded in this research.

In addition to creating a sense of stability due to

thesingle unit

of analysis, the focus on restructurings themselves creates a facade of
artificial calm and consensus.

Take for instance the question of the

role of whites in both CORE and SNCC.

This question was not formally

resolved until fairly late in each organization's history.

However, the

fact that it was not resolved earlier does not mean that it was not a
recurrent problem.

In reality it was a hotly debated issue for several

years before it was addressed in a restructuring.

If an existing

problem is never resolved or manifested in a restructuring,
formally become a part of the analysis.

it will not

In a history depicted through

restructurings much of the intraorganizational dissension and dynamism
is buried because it never, or only very belatedly, becomes manifest in
a structural change.

Perhaps incorporating an analysis of unanswered

catalysts would reduce this bias toward stability:

perhaps what an

organization doesn't do is as important as what it does.
This underlying lack of stability and consensus is depicted in part
in the time lag between a catalyst and its subsequent restructuring.

In
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most instances, though, a specific event shortly before the
restructuring serves as the "straw that breaks the camel's back," and
therefore the long-standing dissensus and unrest remains effectively
hidden.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to declare the first evidence

of problem in an area as the catalyst.

This modified technique would

more obviously display the long-standing uncertainty that eventually is
manifested in a restructuring.

At the same time, though, a complete

exclusion of immediate catalysts would obscure those occurrences that
directly bring about change.
Assigning time dimensions to restructurings presents several
difficulties.

Take the Freedom Rides as an example.

the Rides lasted two weeks.

CORE's segment of

Since the Rides are considered to involve a

change in only one element (A), however, they are recorded as a single
date.

As another example look at SNCC's Food Drive of October 1962

through the following spring.

Since it, too, is only a change in

activities (A), it is recorded simply as October 1962.

Although this

creates a linearity in the sequence of restructurings that does not
correspond precisely to reality, this technique of using the first date
at which an element changes appears to be the best means of handling
this ambiguity:

regardless of the duration of the new value of the

restructured element(s), there is a discernible point at which a change
is noted.

The two types of cases in which this question arises are

temporary shifts in the value

of one or more elements and trends,

or

gradually changing values of the elements.
A temporary change in an element (i.e., the element changes its
value and then reverts to

its previous value) is recorded

occurring at the onset of

the change.

temporally as

A difficulty with some
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restructurings like these is that often the reversion to the original
value of the element is not a meaningful change for the unit.

Take for

instance Freedom Summer and the tremendous influx of white volunteers.
The increased resources represented by these volunteers is definitely a
significant change;

however, the fact that most of the students left at

the end of the summer is not really a significant restructuring.
Granted human resources are decreased here, and rather significantly
numerically.

But in terms of the organization, this loss is not

considered to be a restructuring because the students were brought in
for a predetermined time period and were leaving at the predetermined
time.

(This is similar to receiving a grant--it is the reception of the

grant that is important;

it is not considered to be a separate

restructuring when the grant has all been spent.)

What is significant

for SNCC is not that the majority of the students left, but rather that
80 of them stayed.

In other words if something occurs temporarily when

it was anticipated to be temporary, its conclusion is not a separate
restructuring.

On the other hand, if something turns out to be

temporary when it was planned to be permanent, or vice versa, the second
change in the elemental value is considered to be a significant
restructuring.
This leads to a related issue which does not appear to be relevant
to disasters:

the documentation of trends.

If there is intensified

fund raising, and consequently the organization begins to receive
increased income, what is the relevant date for the increase in income?
It seems necessary here to make a judgment call about what is a
significant change in income.

If, for instance, three months after the

initiation of increased fund raising the organization has raised enough
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money to get itself out of debt, the date for a change in resources is
assigned to this point as a definable threshold.

A gradual increase in

income is then considered to be the normal state until some significant
increase or decrease in income occurs.

If, however,

income begins to

increase almost immediately after intensifying efforts and does not make
any discontinuous leaps, the restructuring of resources is said to occur
at this early point.

Future gradual and continuous increases again are

considered to be part of a normal state.
Take a slightly different example of radicalizing protest
activities.

If the protests of 1963, for example, are noticably more

radical than the protests of 1962, an empirically justifiable date in
1963 is used as the relevant date for this change.

After this date, if

there is no evidence that there was another great burst of increased
radicalization at a later date and there is no reason to suspect that
they became less radical, radicalization of activities is considered to
be an extant and continuous aspect of activities which needs no further
discussion.

Since radicalization is noted and a change to less radical

behavior is not in evidence, it is assumed that progressive
radicalization of protests continues until a subsequent restructuring
denotes a significant leap, either positively or negatively,

in the

degree of radical activities.
Any single element change or any elemental change that is seen as a
threshold mark of a trend, then, is assigned a single date according to
the above criteria.

This appears to be relatively unproblematic as long

as the researcher and the reader recall that trends are considered to
be a component of a normal,

though not static, state.

Once an

element takes on a value it is assumed to maintain that value until the
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end of the prearranged duration of the value or until it is specifically
overruled by a new value of the element.

Restructurings signify

discontinuous changes while trends point to continuous change (Wallace,
1983:144).

A trend must be initiated and terminated by a restructuring:

such a restructuring can document an extant trend which has crossed the
threshold of observability, or it can refer to a sudden dramatic change
in the element's value.

Either way, once documented a trend Is

assumed to remain in existence until another threshold of observability
is crossed or an abrupt change occurs.
For the current research Gamson's categories of success also must
be empirically defined and refined.

Gamson's categories consider gains

in advantages for the constituency and acceptance for the group itself
as a legitimate spokesman to be appropriate dimensions of success.
Little attention is given in this scheme to very non-material forms of
success such as consciousness raising.
forms of success are not recorded.

For my research such elusive

A case could be made that what CORE

and SNCC were attempting, with varying intensity throughout their
histories, was not so much to create formal changes but rather to make
black Americans overcome their false consciousness.

In historical

research it is very difficult to delineate formal successes accurately.
To add to this the very ambiguous categories of sub-cranial changes in
individuals or groups would make this variable hopelessly complex.

Also

the alternative point can be made that if a social movement organization
is to be considered truly successful,

it must gain some concessions from

its antagonists rather than merely improving its beneficiary's
subjective perceptions.
Many of the successes coded here are commonly regarded as successes
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of these particular groups.

However, there are some successes that may

appear to be missing from the analysis.

Keeping in mind two

stipulations may make it easier to realize why these apparent gains are
not considered to be successes of CORE or SNCC.

First, the success must

be directly attributable to the organization itself.

Unlike Gamson, who

does not assume that the protest groups caused the change, I stipulate
that the group must be involved in activities which directly facilitated
the success.

The group's activities preceding the attainment of some

form of success are seen as necessary but not necessarily sufficient for
the success to have occurred.

Under this criterion, then, neither CORE

nor SNCC can be directly tied to a success such as the 1964 Civil Rights
bill;

for although they were active at this time, they were not pushing

specifically for federal legislation in any direct way.

To give them

credit for this legislation would be to assert that any group in
existence at the time of sweeping reform is responsible for the relevant
change.

For Gamson's purposes this is applicable, but when analyzing

groups that existed during the same temporal period it only confuses the
issue and does not permit analysis of the relative successes of separate
groups.
Second,

in addition to being directly attributable to a group, a

success must be linked to the broadest level of the organization to be
considered an organizational success.

For instance a success achieved

by New York CORE working completely without direct assistance or
authorization by the national office would not be considered a CORE
success.

The activities leading to a success, therefore, must be linked

through either initiation or support to the national organization if the
advancement is to be considered a success for the organization itself.
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These stipulations definitely underrepresent the population of successes
that could, in some way, be linked to each organization.

At the same

time, though, such restrictions must be implemented so that a single
level of analysis is maintained throughout the research

L\.

Underrepresentation of successes is assumed to be random so that
comparisons between groups are valid.

CHAPTER THREE
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CORE AND SNCC

INTRODUCTION OF CENTRAL VARIABLES

Table 2 describes the central variables for the analysis of CORE
and SNCC and gives marginals for those variables not provided on
subsequent tables.

These include variables that pertain to several

facets of restructuring, an indication of each restructuring’s linkage
to relevant successes, and other variables that are primarily
organizational characteristics.

These latter measures refer to

characteristics of the organizations at the time of each restructuring;
however, they are not necessarily directly linked to the immediate
change.
The first two variables --NUMBER OF ELEMENTS and METRIC
SCORE--indicate the degree and relative means/ends strain of each
restructuring.

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS indicates how many of the four

possible elements are changed above a threshold of observable difference
during the restructuring.

As discussed in Chapter One, this involves

determinations of which elements change and in what order in relation to
the sixty-four possible configurations (Table 1, p.6).
METRIC SCORE arrays the sixty-four possible FORMS OF RESTRUCTURING
according to the relative predominance of either means-based or
ends-based change.

The metric (Table 3) is created by weighting the
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TABLE 2

43

Central Variables and Their Measurement

Variable

Measurement

Number of Elements

Number of elements changed during
restructuring

Metric Score

Score on derived means-ends metric (+7 to -7)

Time to First Element

Time (in weeks) from appearance of
catalyst until change in first
restructuring element

Total Time

Time (in weeks) from appearance of
catalyst until restructuring is completed

Related to Success

Indicates if restructuring is linked either
causally or temporally to an instance of
success

Year Restructuring Starts

Calendar year in which actual
transformation of elements begins

Conflictual Catalyst

Distinguishes catalysts involving overt
conflict from those catalysts that do not
involve the organization in overt conflict
0 = nonconflictual
CORE N = 3 2 , SNCC N=29
1 = conflictual
CORE N = 8 , SNCCN=13

External Catalyst

Distinguishes catalysts generated within
the organization from those that involve
external entities or events
0 = internal CORE N=26, SNCC N=26
1 = external CORE N = 1 4 ,SNCC N=16

Relative Size

Indicates organizational trend in size
(membership or staff) at time of each
restructuring
1 = Decreasing
CORE N = 7 , SNCC N=ll
2 = Maintaining CORE N=22, SNCC N=23
3 = Increasing
CORE N=ll, SNCC N=8

Relative Income

Indicates organizational trend in income
at time of each restructuring
1 = Decreasing
CORE N=13, SNCC N=18
2 = Maintaining CORE N=ll, SNCC N=13
3 = Increasing
CORE N=16, SNCC N=ll
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

Type of Disjunction

Delineates whether the change in the
value of the first element is problematic or
smooth
1 = change (nonproblematic)
CORE N=29, SNCC N=29
2 = contingency or intra-element disparity
(problematic)
CORE N=ll, SNCC N=13

Scope of Restructuring

Specifies spacial parameters of
organization affected by restructuring
1 = local
CORE N = 0 , SNCC N=5
2 = regional CORE N=17, SNCC N=15
3 = national CORE N=23, SNCC N=22
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TABLE 3
Metric: Means-based versus Ends-based Restructurings

DR

DRAT

RD

DA

DART

RT

D

TR

TRAD

AD

R

T

TA

TARD

AT

A

DTR

DTRA

DRT

DRTA

RDT

RDTA

DRA

RDAT

RDA

RADT

RAD

DTA

DTAR

DAT

DATR

RTD

RTDA

DAR

RTAD

RTA

RATD

RAT

DT

TDR

TDRA

TRD

TRDA

ADT

ADTO

TRA

ADRT

ADR

ARDT

ARD

RA

TD

TDA

TDAR

TAD

TADR

AID

ATDR

TAR

ATRD

ATR

ARTD

ART

AR

-4

-5

+7

+6

+5

+4

+3

+2

+1

0

-1

-2

-3

-6

-7
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value of the first restructuring element, and regressively weighting
each subsequently changing element in a restructuring.

Specifically,

each transformation of either D or T is assigned a plus (+), and each
change in A or R is given a minus (-).

This sign is weighted four times

for the first changing element (i.e., a change in D or T receives a +4
as first transforming element, and an A or R is scored -4 if it changes
first).

The second changing element is weighted three times (i.e., +3

for ends and -3 for means);
-2);

the third element is weighted twice (+2 or

and the fourth element is not weighted at all (+1 or -1).

For

example, a T-D-A form receives a score of +5 [i.e.,(+4)+(+3)+(-2)] while
an A-D restructuring is scored as -1 [i .e .,(-4)+(+3)].
The resulting distribution (Table 3) spans from +7 (pure ends-based
restructuring) to -7 (pure means-based restructuring).

All scores

falling between these pure forms display some interplay between means
and ends in the restructuring.

The scores falling below the zero

midpoint are referred to as means-based because the means elements
change before (or without) a corresponding change in ends.

Conversely,

positive scores point to ends-based change in which changes in the
collective representations occur before (or without) changes in means.
Referring back to Chapter One, means-based changes suggest the
participant as object and greater stability for the organization, while
ends-based restructuring suggests the participant as actor and greater
flexibility.

The four-element forms falling at the midpoint suggest a

balancing of means and ends, since neither ends nor means is dominating
the change.
The next two variables, TIME FROM CATALYST TO FIRST ELEMENT and
TOTAL TIME of restructuring, are intertwined but distinct measures of
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the time factor in restructuring.

TIME FROM CATALYST TO FIRST ELEMENT

documents the time from the occurrence of an identifiable catalyst until
the organization responds with the first change in an element.

TOTAL

TIME is simply the time from the catalyst until the last restructuring
element is in place and the restructuring is considered complete.
SUCCESS indicates whether the restructuring is linked in some
manner to the achievement of an instance of success, as evidenced in
either acceptance for the organization as a legitimate spokesman, or the
gaining of advantages in the form of a common good.
are rather broadly defined.

Linkages to success

The linkages include both temporal links

(meaning the restructuring occurred either immediately before, after, or
coterminously with the success), and causal links.

A link is considered

to be causal if and only if the restructuring is seen as necessary (but
not necessarily sufficient) for the success to have occurred for the
organization, or if the reverse occurs (i.e.

the success is a necessary

(but not sufficient) cause of the restructuring).

Due to the small

number of restructurings that are connected in either sense to one or
more instances of success, this variable is coded as a dichotomy
(0=restructuring is not associated with any success, l=restructuring is
associated with at least one success either temporally or causally).
SUCCESS simply documents whether or not a restructuring is linked in any
way to an instance of success.

An instance of success can logically be

linked to anywhere from one to five restructurings (see Codebook, p.

).

Similarly a specific restructuring can be associated with any number of
successes.

This variable,

then, is a general measure of linkages

between restructurings and successes.

It does not distinguish between

different degrees or types of linkages, and it does not provide a valid
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indication of how many successes a group achieved.
YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS codes each restructuring according to the
calendar year in which the first element change occurs.

This

determination arrays the restructurings chronologically within each
organization, and allows for comparison of restructurings occurring at
the same time in different units.
EXTERNAL CATALYST and CONFLICTUAL CATALYST refer to the catalyst
which precedes each restructuring.

It is assumed that some event or

occurrence precedes and initiates each restructuring;

in other words,

there would be no changes if there were no reason to change.

The actual

types of catalysts cover quite a spectrum of occurrences, from ideas, to
external perceptions of the organization, to the appointment of a key
individual, to a debate within the group.

For comparative purposes the

catalysts are distinguished on the above mentioned dichotomies:

is the

catalyst conflictual or nonconflictual, and is it internal or external.
To be considered conflictual, a catalyst must evidence overt conflict
involving the organization (e.g., a quarrel among members or the
alienation of outside supporters.

Something such as a riot that does

not directly involve CORE or SNCC would be considered nonconflictual in
this scheme, because although it is a conflictual event,

it does not

involve the organization in question in a directly conflictual
situation.)

The internal/external variable distinguishes those

restructurings in which the catalyst is confined to
participants within the organization,

events or

from those in which thecatalyst

involves people or situations which are outside the

organization.

catalyst receives a score on both these variables.
TYPE OF DISJUNCTION refers to the type of change in the first

Each
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element of the restructuring.

As such it is analytically and

empirically distinct from the catalyst.

In Saunders and Kreps'

work all initial changes are termed contingencies.

(1986)

In the current work

the definition for this term has been refined and narrowed, and two
additional categories are introduced to describe first element changes.
CONTINGENCY here refers only to those elemental changes where there is a
problem with the element (e.g., a loss of income, staff not performing
their jobs).

An INTRA-ELEMENT DISPARITY is considered to occur when

there is disagreement about the new value an element should assume--in
this case there is more than one value of the element that is seen as
valid by participants (e.g.

Carmichael's gaining the leadership

position in SNCC through contesting an election, the compromise which
created two wings in SNCC in 1961).

The third form, termed simply

CHANGE, occurs when the transition to the new value of the first element
is smooth and non-problematic (e.g.
tasks, positive change in resources).

a generally agreed upon change in
For statistical purposes,

CONTINGENCIES and INTRA-ELEMENT DISPARITIES are combined to achieve a
simple problematic/non-problematic dichotomy.
SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING refers to the geographic parameters
affected by the restructuring.

Each restructuring is coded as affecting

either a local (i.e., single state or smaller geographic area), regional
(i.e., either North or South), or national region.

For CORE, this

distinction is most validly viewed as an organizational variable because
the scope of the restructurings and the corresponding scope of the
organization are almost perfectly correlated.

For SNCC, however,

it is

a meaningful distinction between individual restructurings.
The final two variables --RELATIVE SIZE and RELATIVE INCOME--refer
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to the organization at the time of restructuring rather than to the
restructurings themselves.

What these variables refer to is the general

trend in income and membership (or staff) at the time of a
restructuring:
constant?

is it increasing, decreasing, or remaining relatively

While a significant and abrupt change in either of these

areas constitutes a restructuring of resources,

the trend lines of these

resources do not offer clearly defined restructurings;

rather they

point to normal states in which money or people are gradually changing
or remaining constant.

A gradual change in human or material resources,

then, is not necessarily a restructuring.

The current variable

distinguishes between those periods in which the normal state for these
resources is a positive or negative gradual change and those periods in
which resources are held at a rather constant level.

FREQUENCIES AND PATTERNS OF RESTRUCTURINGS AND SUCCESSES

Table 4 arrays the 64 logically possible forms of restructuring and
indicates the forms and frequencies which were located in CORE’s and
SNCC's histories.

For both CORE and SNCC the mean metric scores

indicate a strain toward means-based restructuring.

SNCC's mean metric

score of -2.0 quite emphatically points to this greater emphasis on
restructuring means, while

CORE'S mean of -0.8, although still

displaying a strain toward changes in means, points
balanced history of restructurings.

to a

more nearly

For both organizations the modal

metric score is -4, indicating that a single element restructuring of
means (i.e., a change in either R
Looking at the actual

or A) is the most

number of times CORE and

frequent change.
SNCCchanged the
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value of each element,

irrespective of the full configuration of each

restructuring, it is apparent that the metric is not creating artificial
distinctions, but is highlighting actual tendencies in the data.

For

both CORE and SNCC domain was the least frequently changed
element--transformed nine times by CORE and in eleven instances by SNCC.
Tasks were restructured eighteen times by CORE and eleven times by SNCC.
The most frequently restructured element was resources--twenty-two times
by CORE and thirty times by SNCC.

Activities changed in thirteen

instances for CORE and sixteen times for SNCC.

In sum, CORE changed the

values of its ends elements twenty-seven times and its means elements
thirty-five times.
forty-six times.

SNCC altered ends twenty-two times and means
These raw data clearly point to the more means-based

strain of SNCC's restructurings, and the more nearly balanced changes
undergone by CORE.
CORE restructured tasks much more frequently than SNCC did.

SNCC,

however, invoked pure means-based restructuring (A-R or R-A) more
frequently than did CORE.

From the rest of the distribution shown on

Table 4, CORE and SNCC appear to be fairly parallel.

Therefore it seems

that the disparity in mean metric scores between the organizations is
primarily attributable to CORE'S prolific restructuring of tasks and
SNCC's more frequent introduction of pure means-based restructurings.
In addition, the slightly higher incidence of single element means-based
restructuring (A or R) by SNCC, and the single instance of pure
ends-based restructuring (D-T) undertaken by CORE also contribute to the
disparity in the two means.
The bottom of Table 4 details the portion of logically possible
forms of restructuring located in CORE’S and SNCC's histories.

In both
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cases all possible one-element forms occurred during the relevant
history.

The percentage of total forms that can be empirically located

in CORE and SNCC decreases drastically with the transition to
two-element forms.
documented;

For CORE 67% of these possible forms were

for SNCC exactly half (50%) of the logically possible

two-element forms were observed.

With regard to three-element forms,

CORE experienced only 21% of these possible configurations, and SNCC
displays only 12%.

Four-element forms were delineated only in SNCC, and

even there only 8% of the possible configurations were documented.
What is not clearly stated on Table 4, but which is also very
relevant,

is the portion of total restructurings that one-, two-,

three-, and four-element forms each contribute.
predominance of one-element forms:

There is a clear

58% of all CORE'S restructurings and

55% of SNCC's are of this very limited degree.

Adding two-element forms

to the single-element totals accounts for 88% of all restructurings in
each group.

The remaining 12% of CORE'S changes are accounted for by

three-element forms.

For SNCC 7% of the remaining restructurings are

three-element and 5% are four-element configurations.

This points to

the dialectical nature of organization as both process and unit.

That

which exists is always changing, but change is constrained by what
exists.
Tables 5a and 5b provide chronologies of the restructurings in CORE
and SNCC.

From these tables and Appendix C, it is apparent that

although I traced the maintenance system state of CORE for twenty-five
years and of SNCC for only eight years, the two organizations
restructured approximately the same number of times.

While it is

acknowledged that all possible changes have not been documented, it is
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TABLE 5A

CORE--Chronology of Restructurings

FORM

METRIC
SCORE

SUCCESS

6/43

DT

+7

YES

6/44

T

6/45

FORM

METRIC
SCORE

SUCCESS

6/61

DA

+1

YES

+4

10/61

R

-4

YES

T

+4

10/61

RT

-1

YES

4/47

A

-4

4/62

ARD

-5

YES

6/47

T

+4

4/63

RA

-7

YES

6/48

TR

+1

6/63

R

-4

6/48

D

+4

4/64

A

-4

6/49

T

+4

4/64

R

-4

0/50

AR

-7

6/64

T

+4

6/51

TRA

-1

6/64

AD

-1

YES

1/54

RT

-1

8/64

R

-4

YES

6/54

R

-4

10/64

AD

-1

YES

3/56

T

+4

10/64

TR

+1

9/56

R

-4

YES

1/65

R

-4

10/57

TAD

+3

YES

6/65

T

+4

10/59

T

+4

YES

9/65

A

-4

2/60

ATR

-3

1/66

R

-4

10/60

RT

-1

3/66

R

-4

2/61

R

-4

6/66

DR

+1

5/61

A

-4

6/68

RDT

+1

DATE

YES

DATE
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TABLE 5B

SNCC--Chronology of Restructurings

FORM

METRIC
SCORE

SUCCESS

6/61

RD

-1

YES

2/65

T

+4

6/61

TR

+1

--

3/65

A

-4

7/61

RA

-7

--

5/65

A

-4

8/61

DTAR

+4

YES

12/65

R

-4

9/61

RDAT

+1

--

1/66

D

+4

12/61

TR

+1

--

1/66

A

-4

2/62

T

+4

--

5/66

RT

-1

4/62

R

-4

--

5/66

A

-4

4/62

T

+l±

--

6/66

D

+4

6/62

DR

+1

--

6/66

R

-4

10/62

A

-4

7/66

AR

-7

12/62

R

-4

--

10/66

RD

-1

6/63

R

-4

YES

11/66

RA

-7

9/63

DRA

-1

YES

12/66

DR

+1

2/64

A

-4

--

2/67

R

-4

4/64

AR

-7

--

5/67

RDT

+1

5/64

RA

-7

YES

7/67

R

-4

9/64

R

-4

YES

6/68

RT

-1

9/64

A

-4

--

7/68

R

-4

10/64

R

-4

12/68

R

-4

10/64

RA

-7

6/69

DRT

+3

DATE

DATE

FORM

METRIC
SCORE

SUCCESS
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assumed that additional restructurings occurred randomly throughout the
organizations' histories, and that the current research has captured a
comparable portion of the total possible restructurings for both groups.
CORE, then, displays 40 instances of restructuring in 25 years for a
mean of 1.60 restructurings per year.

SNCC restructured 42 times in 8

years resulting in a mean annual rate of 5.25 restructurings.
In the years immediately following the transition from origins to
maintenance (i.e., the initiation of organization as marked by the
co-presence of all four elements), both CORE and SNCC were more
ends-based in their restructurings than they were later in their
histories.

For CORE this results in a mean metric score for the 1940's

of 3.6--a very pronounced ends-based strain.

For SNCC this ends-based

period falls only slightly above the midpoint with a mean of 0.4 for the
first ten restructurings.

For both organizations this orientation

towards changing the organization’s ends is even more specifically a
concentrated focus on subsequent changes in the task structure.

CORE'S

period of ends-based restructuring was much more pronounced and longer
than SNCC's, although both groups clearly show a greater emphasis on
ends (especially tasks) early in their maintenance system states.
In absolute chronological years, then, this early period of
ends-based restructurings lasted much longer for CORE than for SNCC--six
years for CORE compared to a single year for SNCC.

In relation to the

temporal duration of each organization, this disparity between the
groups diminishes, but does not disappear.

For CORE this early

ends-based phase encompassed 24% of its total temporal history, while
for SNCC it occupied only 12.5% of the total duration.

However,

in

looking at the portion of restructurings ecompassed in this phase, the
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disparity between the two groups virtually disappears.

CORE'S focus on

ends-based changes encompassed its first eight restructurings, or 20% of
its entire chronology;

for SNCC this early period was composed of the

first ten restructurings, or 23.8% of its total changes.

CORE, then,

spent more years and a larger portion of its total history in initial
restructurings which focused quite specifically on ends.

SNCC underwent

approximately the same number of restructurings during this phase, but
its changes occurred in a much shorter absolute and relative time period
and were less dominated by single changes in ends.
Following this early ends-based sequence, both groups switched to a
period of strict means-based changes.

For SNCC this second phase

continued uninterrupted for two years (October 1962 through October
1964).

CORE made this transition to a means-based period in 1950;

however, during the latter half of the 1950's it reverted to another
series of predominantly ends-based changes.

By 1960 CORE once again

began a means-based series of restructurings, which continued for
slightly more than four years (February 1960 through April 1964).
Similar to the initial phase of ends-based changes, this major period of
means-based changes (CORE'S second means-based segment and SNCC's total
means-based phase) lasted longer in terms of actual chronological years
for CORE than for SNCC (four years for CORE compared to two years for
SNCC).

Also like the earlier series, this disparity virtually

disappears when the actual number of relevant restructurings is
considered--twelve restructurings (30%) for CORE and eleven changes
(26%) for SNCC).
The final segment of both organizations' histories was composed of
a mixed series of restructurings.

In both cases individual ends-based
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restructurings were interspersed among the more abundant means-based
changes.

For the final mixed segment, the comparability between groups

is evident in absolute time, but not in the proportion of time or
restructurings encompassed by this phase.

Both CORE and SNCC spent

approximately four years in this final phase.

For SNCC, though, this

means that 29% of its entire history and 50% of all restructurings
occurred in this final period, while for CORE only 16% of its total time
and 30% of its restructurings fell in this mixed period.
In both groups this final period of mixed restructurings coincided
with decreasing prosperity.

These mixed periods were immediately

preceded by a restructuring which decreased usable resources.
Throughout the rest of this final phase, with the exception of the
introduction of single key individuals, neither organization underwent
any positive restructurings of resources.

SNCC, then, spent half of its

history in this period of progressively declining prosperity.

CORE,

however, spent the majority of its life-span in the relatively
prosperous earlier phases.
In addition to displaying similar, though not identical, patterns
of restructuring,

there are several interesting patterns within

coterminous time-frames for the two groups.

CORE and SNCC existed

coterminously as organizations from early 1961 until June of 1968.
(Remember that technically both groups remained in existence until the
early 1970's, but that significant breaks with their former identities
as noted by the final restructuring for each group signifies the end of
the current analysis.)

The first similarity is the marked strain toward

means-based restructurings that prevails throughout the I960's.
CORE this is seen in a mean metric score for this decade of -2.1

For
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(compared to a pre-1960 mean metric score of 1.1 and an overall mean of
-0.8), while for SNCC it is simply the overall mean metric of -2.0.
restructurings of this decade are also relatively frequent.

The

SNCC

restructured an average of 5.6 times annually during this coterminous
phase.

CORE'S annual average increased from one restructuring per year

during the 1940's and 1950's to an average of three changes annually
during the I960's.
Not only is the decade predominated by frequent means-based
changes, but there is also a similarity in the date of transition from
the segment of uniformly means-based changes to the phase of mixed
restructurings --mid-1964 for CORE and the end of 1964 for SNCC.

This

similarity is seen also in the restructuring which immediately preceded
the transition to the mixed-phase for each group--a restructuring in
1964 involving a decrease in usable resources.
In addition to the similar dates for the transition from
means-based changes to a phase of mixed restructurings, the two groups
remained in this final phase for approximately the same number of years.
This is striking because a similarity in absolute time is not noted in
earlier phases.

Regardless of the date used for the final demises of

CORE and SNCC (the late 1960’s as they are traced here or the early
1970's), they existed for approximately the same amount of time after
their temporally similar transitions to the period of mixed
restructurings.

Extrapolating from the fact that the earlier common

phases showed consistency between the number or proportion of
restructurings encompassed by each segment,

it would be hypothesized

that this final phase would also show such a pattern.

However, what is

apparent here is a consistency in absolute time, not relative
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proportions.

This similarity, and the initiation of the mixed phases by

temporally similar set-backs in resources, might be pointing to the
importance of external variables and conditions.

This, however, leads

to a level of explanation that cannot be approached in the current
research.

Rather I can only say that CORE and SNCC both entered their

final phases within less than a year of each other, these final periods
began following a set-back in resources, and within approximately four
years both groups had ceased to be viable or effective entities.
The final similarity among temporal parameters involves the
clustering of successes.

The majority of restructurings associated with

successes for both groups occurred between the summer of 1961 and the
fall of 1964.

On Tables 5a and 5b the columns labeled "Success"

indicate those restructurings that are linked either temporally or
causally to at least one instance of success.

Using this relatively lax

criteria six of SNCC's restructurings and thirteen of CORE'S changes are
considered to be related to successes.

Each restructuring can be

connected in a variety of ways to any number of successes (see
Codebook).

Therefore, the size of the cluster is not necessarily

indicative of the number of successes associated with it.

For instance,

the cluster of three CORE restructurings between June and October 1964
is pointing to a single instance of success.

However, the preceding

cluster of six success-connected restructurings depicts multiple
linkages for each restructuring to a corresponding cluster of five
successes.
The majority of success-connected restructurings are composed of
solely temporal links.

Several restructurings are linked both

temporally and causally to an instance of success.

In both groups only
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one link is solely causal--meaning that the causally linked
restructuring and relevant success are separated in time.
success-related restructurings,
connections.

Most

therefore, are detailing temporal

In general CORE'S and SNCC's success-related

restructurings are related by virtue of when they occurred rather than
by their content.

Even most of those restructurings that showed causal

relationships with an instance of success occurred in close temporal
proximity to the relevant success.
A portion of the noted clustering of success-related restructurings
is to be expected since temporal, in addition to causal, links are
delineated.

This clustering of success-related changes, though,

reflecting something more--clusters of successes themselves.

is

CORE is

coded as having achieved eight instances of success, and SNCC is
considered to have gained four such successes.
randomly

These successes are

scattered throughout CORE'S or SNCC's total histories.

not
Rather,

five of CORE'S eight successes occurred between the summer of 1961 and
the end of 1962.

For SNCC this clustering is less pronounced, but even

here two

of its four successes occurred in the summer of 1964. For

CORE and

SNCC, then, the majority of successes occurred during the

both

means-based phases of the early 1960's.
As is the case with all temporally coterminous similarities in this
research,

it would be mere speculation rather than rigorous science for

me to attempt to explain this commonality by reference to either the
effect of similar organizaional configurations or to external events.
As will be seen later, the chronological year in which a restructuring
takes place is a very central variable with regard to many other
measures.

However, to speculate about the specific influences or
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conditions of this larger world environment would lead to the type of
unsubstantiated conjecture that plagues so much of social science.
While it provides an incomplete answer, the current work seeks to remain
within the limits of what is known rather than to venture into the
intuitively satisfying but scientifically untenable realm of premature
explanation and haphazard causal relationships.
Patterns of Sequential Restructurings
Linn (1986) introduced (from Wallace, 1983) the term rhythm to
describe consistency of forms of restructuring (as seen in metric
scores) across a sequence of changes.
imprecise,
recognize.

While the term itself is

the patterning that it, in part, points to is important to
A search for patterns in exploratory work such as this is an

attempt to capture an absence of randomness rather than to demand
absolutely pure forms of pattern.

There are several types of patterns

across subsequent restructurings that are potentially informative to
detail.

The first type is the general pattern across the organization’s

entire maintenance state.

This is most broadly delineated as the

ends-based, means-based, mixed period sequence detailed above.
The second type of patterning is most closely aligned to what Linn
termed rhythm--an absolute consistency of metric scores across a
sequence of two or more restructurings.
both CORE and SNCC in several series.

This consistency is noted in
Referring back to Tables 5a and

5b, CORE displays seven such chains, and SNCC shows six sequences of
identical adjacent metric scores.

The majority of such chains involve

only two restructurings, and none continue for more than three
consecutive changes.

It is difficult to interpret these short chains of

consistency within the longer chains comprising the organizations’
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histories.

SNCC's chronology suggests that a phase of means-based

changes shows most rhythm, while a period of ends-based change is least
rhythmic.
clear.

For CORE this same pattern is evident but it is much less

Here three of the seven chains occur in means-based phases, with

two chains in the ends-based periods and two in the final mixed phase.
In general it could be concluded that, in Linn's definition of the term,
means-based phases tend to be most rhythmic.
Given the posited value of interplay between means-based and
ends-based restructuring during an organization's history, rhythm in the
above sense would theoretically be a detrimental patterning.

Unless the

rhythm involves a series of four-element forms which fall at the
mid-point of the metric, such patterning points to a repetitive focus on
changes of either ends or means.

This is clearly seen in CORE and SNCC

where the majority of rhythmic chains are composed of series of either
-4 or +4.

These scores point more toward a pure form of either

means-based or ends-based restructurings than to the balanced mid-point.
Since both groups show approximately the same number of these short
rhythmic chains, the relationship between rhythm and longevity appears
to be negligible.
clear.

The value, or debility,

in terms of success is not

In general successes were achieved during means-based phases of

restructuring, and these means-based periods tend to be most rhythmic.
For SNCC three of its six success-related restructurings are members of
rhythmic chains.

CORE, though, has only one of its success-related

changes involved in such a chain.

In fact most successes were achieved

during CORE’S non-rhythmic segment of its primary means-based period.
In terms of extended periods, then, phases encompassing more rhythm tend
to be associated with success.

With regard to individual
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restructurings, though, the majority of rhythmic restructurings are not
associated with successes and at best only half of all success-related
restructurings are involved in rhythmic chains.

From this it appears

that while periods of means-based changes are associated with success,
absolute rhythm is neither beneficial nor detrimental to either the
organization's viability or its attainment of success.
A patterned mixture of means and ends is another potentially
important form of patterning.

If rhythm should theoretically be

detrimental to an organization, a mixed pattern should provide the
needed dialectical interplay between ends and m eans.

Overall the

average metric scores point to a greater interplay between means and
ends for CORE than for SNCC.

This is not capturing the exact patterning

among adjacent changes, but it appears that overall balance may be
associated with longevity.

Balance could also be associated with

success since CORE was more balanced and more successful than SNCC.

As

another component of this, it is noted that CORE'S period of most
concentrated successes (i.e., the means-based phase of the early 1960s)
included one ends-based restructuring compared to SNCC's strictly
means-based phase, pointing to a slightly, although perhaps negligibly,
more balanced period.

Overall balance, then, may be associated with

both longevity and success.
Within these complete histories, however, it was during a
strongly means-based period, not a mixed phase that most successes were
achieved.

The final phase when means and ends were most pointedly and

consistently interspersed was also the time of disintegration for both
groups.

This is not to say, necessarily, that an intermingling of

means and ends is detrimental.

It seems more accurate to point to the
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commencement of decline before the organizations began these phases.
The content of these changes in the final period may also be important
in understanding this final period.
The value of any type of patterning is not clear in this small
number of cases and these short patterned chains.

Rhythm (indicated by

consistent metric scores on adjacent changes) appears to be associated
with means-based and successful periods, but not necessarily with
success-related restructurings.

Overall balance is associated with

longevity and greater success, but again it is restructurings during the
unbalanced periods which are specifically related to successes.

Rhythm

occurs most pointedly during periods of prosperity while balance is
associated with the final declining phase.

This is opposite of the

hypothesized value of the dialectical relationship between means and
ends.

However, it fits quite closely Starbuck's (1983) view of

organizations as propelled by inertia when things are going well and
questioning their ends only when an unignorable problem arises.
Timing of Restructurings
CORE and SNCC restructured approximately the same number of times
during their relevant histories.

Since SNCC existed for a much shorter

time than CORE, it logically follows that it restructured much more
frequently in its given time-frame.

From the first columns in Tables 6a

and 6b it is possible to fully grasp this disparity.

Comparing the

dates of subsequent restructurings provides a measure of the intervening
time between the commencement of one restructuring and the next.

CORE'S

history displays an average intervening time of over ten months between
the early restructurings in the ends-based phase.

This time between

restructurings drops drastically with the onset of the 1960's.

During

TABLE 6A

Date
6/43
6/44
6/45
4/47
6/47
6/48
6/48
6/49
0/50
6/51
1/54
6/54
3/56
9/56
10/57
10/59
2/60
10/60
2/61
5/61
6/61
10/61
10/61
4/62
4/63
6/63
4/64
4/64
6/64
6/64
8/64
10/64
10/64
1/65
6/65
9/65
1/66
3/66
6/66
6/68

CORE--Chronology of Restructurings and Timing of
(Time Expressed in Weeks)
Time From
Time From
Catalyst
First To
To First
Last Element
Form
Element
DT
T
T
A
T
TR
D
T
AR
TRA
RT
R
T
R
TAD
T
ATR
RT
R
A
DA
R
RT
ARD
RA
R
A
R
T
AD
R
AD
TR
R
T
A
R
R
DR
RDT

XX = Uncertain
-- «= Not Applicable

XX
XX
52
40
260
52
20
XX
XX
104
52
156
XX
XX
16
104
2
32
16
20
12
0
20
36
0
0
36
XX
XX
0
16
8
8
36
104
0
4
8
3
52

0

0

XX
0
0

116
20
8

28
52
76
8

52
3
12

0
12

Elements
Time Fn
Catalys
To Last
Element
XX
XX
52
40
260
52
20
XX
XX
104
52
156
XX
XX
132
104
22
40
16
20
40
0
72
112
8
0
36
XX
XX
52
16
11
20
36
104
0
4
8
3
64

TABLE 6B

SNCC--Chronology of Restructurings and Timing of Elements
(Time Expressed in Weeks)

Date

Form

6/61
6/61
7/61
8/61
9/61
12/61
2/62
4/62
4/62
6/62
10/62
12/62
6/63
9/63
2/64
4/64
5/64
9/64
9/64
10/64
10/64
2/65
3/65
5/65
12/65
1/66
1/66
5/66
5/66
6/66
6/66
7/66
10/66
11/66
12/66
2/67
5/67
7/67
6/68
7/68
12/68
6/69

RD
TR
RA
DTAR
RDAT
TR
T
R
T
DR
A
R
R
DRA
A
AR
RA
R
A
R
RA
T
A
A
R
D
A
RT
A
D
R
AR
RD
RA
DR
R
RDT
R
RT
R
R
DRT

XX = Uncertain
-- = Not Applicable

Time From
Catalyst
To First
Element
32
XX
0
8
4
12
64
XX
0
0
0
24
XX
0
12
12
20
0
3
8
6
0
2
16
XX
0
24
0
XX
0
6
12
16
20
12
4
16
0
16
1
0
0

Time From
First To
Last Element
0
XX
4
5
8
19

24

10
3
4

12

0

12
0
0
20
0
0

4

Time From
Catalyst
To Last
Element
32
XX
4
13
4
31
64
XX
0
24
0
24
XX
10
12
15
24
0
3
8
18
0
2
16
XX
0
24
0
XX
0
6
24
16
20
32
4
16
0
16
1
0
4

68

the means-based phase early in this decade, CORE restructured on an
average of once every 4.5 months.

In the final mixed phase the average

intervening period between the onset of subsequent restructurings was
even slightly less (an average of 4.3 months).
SNCC began its history by averaging a new restructuring every 1.3
months during its ends-based phase.

This rapid initiation of new

restructurings slowed down slightly during its later phases to average
one change every 2.4 months in the means-based period and a change every
2.6 months in the final mixed phase.

The 1960s were a time of very

frequent restructurings, then, for both CORE and SNCC.
never restructured as quickly in succession as SNCC.

CORE, however,
An interesting

disparity between the two groups here is that as CORE progressed though
the stages from predominantly ends-based, to means-based, to mixed
restructurings its changes occurred with progressive frequency.

For

SNCC, though, each subsequent period included a slight decrease in the
frequency of restructuring.
SNCC restructured much more frequently than CORE:
restructured much more quickly.

it also

The mean time for CORE restructurings

from the appearance of a catalyst until the last restructuring element
was in place was 51.75 weeks (median=38 weeks).
mean was 12.73 weeks (median=10 weeks).

For SNCC the comparable

The disparity in total time is

not a result of first element lag, for in the actual time of
restructuring (the time from the change in the first element to the
change in the last restructuring element) the vast disparity is still
apparent:

24 weeks for CORE compared to 6.7 weeks for SNCC.

Comparable disparities between the mean total time are evident in
every period of the organizations' histories, as is a common trend of
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later restructurings being completed much more quickly.

During the

initial ends-based periods, CORE’S mean total time of restructuring was
approximately 85 weeks, while SNCC's comparable mean was 22 weeks.

The

means-based phase encompassed changes that took an average of 33 weeks
for CORE to complete and 11 weeks for SNCC.

Finally in the mixed phase,

both organizations experienced their fastest overall restructurings--29
weeks for CORE and slightly under 10 weeks for SNCC.

In general, then,

both organizations restructured much more quickly later in their
histories.

SNCC always restructured more quickly than CORE.

Across the

comparable periods this disparity between the groups persists, and even
in its fastest period, CORE did not complete restructurings

as quickly

as SNCC did in its slowest phase.
Due to the tremendous difference in the average number
restructurings

per year, this disparity between the two groups in total

time may appear to be a foregone conclusion.
the case.

of

This is not necessarily

Since restructurings can overlap temporally, the more

frequent SNCC restructurings could be arranged in a muddled
configuration of overlapping restructurings with relevant "normal"
states being discernible only with respect to a particular
restructuring.

This is not what is occurring in SNCC, though.

Rather

the relatively linear arrangement of restructurings is maintained with
the restructuring process just occurring much more quickly and with
shorter time periods between restructurings.

CORRELATIONS AMONG CENTRAL VARIABLES

The following section will provide a discussion of the
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relationships among the central variables.

First, the correlations

common to both organizations will be outlined, followed by additional
relationships which are unique to CORE and SNCC, respectively.
Correlations involving changes in each specific element will complete
this chapter.

A comparison of current findings to disaster-related

findings using Kreps1 model and a synthesis of the findings on CORE and
SNCC will follow in Chapter Four.
All correlations discussed in the following sections surpass a
criterion of significance at the 0.1 level.

This is a rather loose

criterion for inclusion in rigorous statistical analysis;

however, the

current work is an exploratory undertaking which seeks to illuminate
potential patterns and directions of relationships rather than a rigidly
structured testing of extant hypotheses.

So, while such an inclusive

level of significance may allow relatively weak relationships to enter
the study, it is better at this point to bring these possible
relationships to light so that they can be more rigorously tested in
future research, than to eliminate potentially meaningful relationships
at this preliminary stage.
Common Correlations for Both CORE and SNCC
As seen on Tables 7a and 7b, TOTAL TIME is negatively related to
the YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS (CORE r— .45, SNCC r=-.32).

Earlier

restructurings take longer to complete and later ones are completed much
more quickly.

As discussed above, restructurings during the 1960's for

CORE were much shorter than those that occur prior to 1960.

It is quite

possible that something about the general environment of the 1960's
promoted faster restructurings.

If this is the case, it is an

interesting finding, and corresponds to the previously discussed finding
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TABLE 7A

CORE--Correlation Coefficients and Levels of Significanc e

Number
of
Elements

Number of
Elements

1.000

Metric Score

Metric
Score

Time To
First
Element

Total
Time

Related
to
Success

.001
(.496)

- .145
(.214)

.139
(.224)

.216
(.091)

1.000

.406
(.011)

.446
(.005)

- .076
(.319)

1.000

.888
(.000)

- .248
(.085)

1.000

- .003
(.494)

Time to
First Element
Total Time

Related to
Success

1.000

Year
Re s true tur ing
Starts

.062
(.353)

- .428
(.003)

- .498
(.002)

- .446
(.005)

.139
(.196)

Conflictual
Catalyst

- .213
(.094)

- .075
(.323)

- .130
(.240)

- .237
(.096)

- .214
(.093)

External
Catalyst

.097
(.277)

- .320
(.022)

- .337
(.029)

- .369
(.019)

.050
(.379)

Relative Size

- .064
(.347)

- .263
(.050)

- .365
(.020)

- .267
(.070)

.378
(.008)

Relative
Income

.098
(.273)

- .124
(.222)

.060
(.371)

.182
(.139)

.316
(.023)

Type of
Disjunction

- .083
(.305)

- .379
(.008)

- .047
(.398)

- .077
(.337)

- .188
(.122)

Scope of
Restructuring

.097
(.276)

- .275
(.043)

- .535
(.001)

- .454
(.005)

.165
(.155)

1.550
.714

7.175
3.727

Mean
Std Dev

39.656
54.984

51.750
56.401

.325
.474
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TABLE 7B

SNCC- -Correlation Coefficients and Levels of SignifL

Number
of
Elements

Number of
Elements

1.000

Metric Score

Metric
Score

Time To
First
Element

Total
Time

Related
to
Success

.267
(.044)

- .027
(.437)

.146
(.194)

.274
(.039)

1.000

.029
(.432)

.070
(.341)

- .014
(.465)

1.000

.887
(.000)

.080
(.318)

1.000

.091
(.296)

Time to
First Element
Total Time

Related to
Success

1.000

Year
Restructuring
Starts

- .195
(.108)

- .111
(.243)

- .206
(.111)

- .315
(.029)

- .317

Conflictual
Catalyst

- .129
(.207)

- .064
(.344)

- .172
(.154)

- .206
(•111)

- .273
(.040)

External
Catalyst

- .054
(.366)

.122
(.221)

- .128
(.226)

- .185
(.136)

.100
(.264)

Relative Size

.125
(.216)

.069
(.331)

- .038
(.411)

.009
(.479)

(.001)

Relative
Income

.084
(.299)

- .102
(.260)

.012
(.471)

.085
(.309)

(.000)

Type of
Disjunction

.060
(.353)

- .225
(.076)

- .123
(.235)

- .072
(.335)

- .126
(.213)

Scope of
Re s true tur ing

- .022
(.445)

.184
(.122)

- .215
(.101)

- .152
(.185)

- .140
(.188)

1.619
.825

5.952
3.568

Mean
Std Dev

9.460
12.639

12.730
13.541

(.020)

.451

.502

.143
.354
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that SNCC's average time of restructuring was much shorter than CORE'S.
There appears to be a bit more to this relationship than a simple
response to external factors, because SNCC, whose entire life history
was contained in the 1960's, also exhibits this same trend.

If it were

just that the 1960's were a time of rapid change, we would expect the
disparity between the two groups' means, but would not^expect SNCC to
show a significant decrease in time of restructuring throughout its
history.
METRIC SCORE is negatively related to the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION (CORE
r=-.38, SNCC r=-.22).

The more problematic the change in the first

element, the lower the metric score.

Keep in mind that a problematic

first element can entail a sudden problem with an element or can refer
to a disagreement about the element's potential new form.
relationship is much stronger for CORE than for SNCC.

This

The mean metric

score for a restructuring with a nonproblematic first element for CORE
is 0.0, while those with problematic disjunctions average only -3.1 on
the metric.

For SNCC nonproblematic disjunctions show an average metric

score of -1.5 while restructurings with problematic disjunctions have a
mean of -3.2.

A problematic change in the first element occurred more

frequently in changes of activities or resources than in domains or
tasks.

While 31% of SNCC's restructurings with problematic disjunctions

and 44% of CORE'S involved changes in the ends elements (i.e., D or T ) ,
in the vast majority of problematic disjunctions, the problematic
first-element change itself involved either A or R.

A sudden problem

with an element, the most common type of problematic disjunction, occurs
more frequently in an organization's means than its ends.
A restructuring's relationship to SUCCESS is positively correlated
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with the NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (CORE r=.22, SNCC r=.27).

More complete

restructurings are more likely to be linked to an instance of success
than are those that are less complete.

Since only thirteen

restructurings for CORE and six for SNCC are linked to at least one
instance of success, any statistical relationship involving these few
cases must be viewed very tentatively.

Similar to the overall

distribution, the majority of success-related restructurings involve
changes in only one or two elements.

However, one-element forms are

significantly under-represented in success-related restructurings
compared to their overall frequency.

For CORE one-element forms account

for 58% of all restructurings but for only 38% of success-related
changes.

Similarly for SNCC, 55% of all restructurings but only 33% of

success-related changes consist of a change in a single element.

For

CORE this under-representation of one-element forms is compensated for
by an over-representation of two-element changes, while success-related
three-element forms occur in comparable proportion to their overall
incidence.

SNCC's two-element forms account for 33% of both total and

success-related changes, but both three- and four-element forms are
significantly over-represented in the success-related restructurings.
The few extensive changes combined with the small number of
success-related restructurings makes definite statistical assertions
impossible.

At this initial step in the exploration of social movement

organizations, however,

it appears that changes in more than one element

are more likely than single element changes to be related to success.
A CONFLICTUAL CATALYST is less likely to be associated with SUCCESS
than a nonconflictual one (CORE r=-.21, SNCC r=-.27).

For CORE only one

of the thirteen restructurings associated with success sprang from a
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conflictual catalyst, while none of SNCC's six success-related
restructurings started from a conflictual catalyst.

While it is true

that successes occurred during the time in the organizations' histories
when they were experiencing less conflictual catalysts,

it is also true

that in periods encompassing both conflictual and nonconflictual
catalysts, linkages to success are conspicuously absent for conflictual
catalyst restructurings.

In short, changes that arise as a response to

overt conflict are less likely than their non-conflictual counterparts
to be associated with success.
RELATIVE SIZE and RELATIVE INCOME are both positively related to
SUCCESS (CORE size r=.38, income r=.32;

SNCC size r=.45, income r=.50).

Recall that these variables are referring to trends in the organization
at the time of the restructuring rather than to specific changes in the
immediate restructuring.

It is not so much that restructurings

occurring during periods of increasing trends in income and size are
more likely to be associated with success than those occurring during
stable phases of resources.

Rather this correlation is pointing to the

virtual absence of success-related restructurings when size and income
are decreasing.

Because most linkages between restructurings and

successes are at least in part temporal, this points again to the
relatively prosperous means-based period of restructurings in the early
1960's as the prime era for the achievement of successes.
this is only descriptive;

Once again

evaluating the independent contributions of

prosperity and broader effects of specific time frames can come only
with more research on temporally disparate groups

5

Appendix C depicts all correlations between the twelve central
variables.

Looking only at the relationships among the seven variables
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whose intercorrelations are not presented on Tables 7a and 7b, the
following common relationships are apparent.

YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING

STARTS is significantly correlated with all of these variables except
EXTERNAL CATALYST.

For both CORE and SNCC it is positively correlated

with CONFLICTUAL CATALYST, TYPE OF DISJUNCTION, and SCOPE OF THE
RESTRUCTURING.

The later the restructuring occurs, therefore, the more

likely it has a conflictual catalyst, a problematic change in the first
element and affects a broader scope.
The correlations relating YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS with
CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and TYPE OF DISJUNCTION are much higher for SNCC
than they are for CORE (CORE:
disjunction r=.28;
disjunction r=.42).

SNCC:

conflictual catalyst r=.30, type of

conflictual catalyst r=.53, type of

Before the comparable cutting points in 1964 (i.e.,

the onset of the final mixed phase) both CORE and SNCC had relatively
few conflictual catalysts.

During this early period only 11% of CORE's

restructurings were started by a conflictual catalyst, and only 5% of
SNCC's changes were connected to such catalysts.

In their later years,

though, the portion of restructurings set off by conflictual catalysts
increased dramatically.

In this final phase, 31% of CORE'S changes and

fully 52% of SNCC's restructurings were preceded by conflictual
catalysts.

In both groups, then, later restructurings were much more

frequently carried out as responses to a disputive environment than were
early changes.
A similar pattern is evident with regard to disjunctions.
Twenty-two percent of CORE's restructurings before April 1964 involved a
problematic change in the first element.

In the final period, this

percentage increased to include 38% of all changes.

For SNCC only 5% of
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its pre-October 1964 changes involved a problematic transition in the
first element.

After this date, though, fully 52% of SNCC's

restructurings involved either a sudden problem in an element or a
disagreement over an element's new value.

Both groups, then,

experienced significant increases in the proportion of restructurings
involving conflictual catalysts and/or problematic disjunctions during
their final years.
SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is correlated with YEAR THE
RESTRUCTURING STARTS much more strongly for CORE than for SNCC (CORE
r=.79, SNCC r=.34).

The later the year the broader the geographic scope

affected by the restructurings.

For CORE this means that later

restructurings quite consistently affected the entire organization,
while for SNCC some local and regional restructurings were interspersed
among its later changes.

For CORE the correlation between SCOPE OF THE

RESTRUCTURING and SCOPE OF THE ORGANIZATION is so high that the former
becomes an artifactual variable which does not discriminate among
individual restructurings within a given time-frame.

For SNCC there is

enough fluctuation in the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING with respect to the
organization's scope during various periods, that the former delineates
meaningful distinctions between unique restructurings.
RELATIVE INCOME is negatively correlated with YEAR THE
RESTRUCTURING STARTS for both CORE and SNCC (CORE r=-.25, SNCC r=-.67).
A later year is associated with a
that this correlation is

decreasing trend

in income.The fact

stronger for SNCC is a reflection of SNCC's

overall shorter history.

It will be recalled that

income began in mid-1964

for CORE and in late-1964

temporal mid-point fell in the mid-1950's;

therefore,

a negative trend in
for SNCC.CORE's
its relatively
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later period encompassed a period of economic growth and maintenance as
well as its final decline.

With SNCC's shorter total history, the

transition from relative prosperity to progressive impoverishment
coincided with its temporal mid-point.

Therefore for SNCC,

points to a time when income was steadily decreasing.

"later"

For CORE "later"

covers a much longer time which encompassed both positive and negative
trends in monetary resources.
Although RELATIVE SIZE is significantly correlated with YEAR THE
RESTRUCTURING STARTS for both CORE and SNCC, the relationship is in
opposite directions.

For CORE later restructurings are associated with

periods of higher relative size (r=.24), while for SNCC later changes
occurred during phases of decreasing size (r=-.70).

This again is a

reflection of the very different durations of the two organizations'
histories.

After the relevant dates in 1964 the size of both CORE and

SNCC never again increased.

For both groups, though, size is considered

to remain relatively constant until the adoption of Black Power in 1966.
For CORE, then, the long period of very slow growth at the beginning of
its history coupled with the tremendous growth in the early sixties (a
part of CORE's "later" history) and the rather late date for an actual
decline in size, work together to create a slightly positive
correlation.

SNCC's increasing size fairly early in its history

combined with the pattern of constancy and then decline in its later
history create a significant negative relationship.

It is also

important here that SNCC has more restructurings recorded in the
post-1966 period, and therefore this period of decline for both
organizations is more evident in SNCC's correlations.
A CONFLICTUAL CATALYST is negatively correlated with RELATIVE
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INCOME and positively related to TYPE OF DISJUNCTION for both CORE and
SNCC (CORE:

relative income r=-.26, type of disjunction r=.25;

relative income r=-.43, type of disjunction r=.44).

SNCC:

As income decreased

conflictual catalysts increased, and problematic disjunctions were more
frequently associated with conflictual catalysts than were
nonproblematic disjunctions.
This relationship with RELATIVE INCOME is reflecting a significant
increase in conflictual catalysts as size decreased rather than a
reduction of conflictual catalysts while size was increasing.

In both

CORE and SNCC a decrease in income preceded an increase in conflictual
catalysts.

The lack of a significant relationship between EXTERNAL

CATALYST and RELATIVE INCOME for SNCC shows that the conflict was not
predominantly internal or external, but rather that it increased on all
fronts with decreasing income.

For CORE, there is a slight (though not

significant) negative relationship between EXTERNAL CATALYSTS and
RELATIVE INCOME and a significant negative relationship between
CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (r— .24) indicating that as
income decreased, catalysts became slightly more externally generated;
however, the conflictual catalysts remained exclusively internally
generated.

Therefore, as income decreased (i.e., during the final

period of mixed restructurings beginning in 1964), both CORE and SNCC
experienced an increase in conflictual catalysts.

However, for CORE

these conflictual catalysts remained internally generated, while for
SNCC conflictual antecedents to change arose in both the internal and
external environment.
For SNCC the relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and
PROBLEMATIC DISJUNCTIONS is very straight forward:

conflictual
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catalysts are more frequently associated with problematic disjunctions
than nonconflictual catalysts, and the majority of conflictual catalysts
are followed by problematic disjunctions.
relationship is not so obvious.

For CORE, though, the

Most problematic disjunctions are

associated with conflictual catalysts, but fully half of the conflictual
catalysts are associated with nonproblematic disjunctions.

In short, if

a restructuring is known to have a problematic first element,

it can

logically be retrospectively surmised that the restructuring had a
conflictual catalyst.

However, if a restructuring has a conflictual

catalyst, there is no reason to assume that it will have a problematic
disjunction.
RELATIVE INCOME and RELATIVE SIZE are positively related (CORE
r=.48, SNCC r=.68).

In both CORE and SNCC an increase or a decrease in

income precedes the corresponding change in size, indicating that these
organizations did not gain income because they were large or lose income
because of a waning constituency.

Rather their human resources began

trends that mimicked extant trends in material resources.
In sum, the following correlations hold for both CORE and SNCC.
Earlier restructurings are completed much more quickly than later
restructurings.

Such early changes also arise from less conflictual

catalysts, rarely involve problematic changes in the first element, and
are enveloped by periods of relative financial prosperity.

Changes

which spring from conflictual catalysts are more likely to occur in
periods of decreasing income and to involve a problematic change in the
first restructuring element.

These restructurings with problematic

disjunctions, in turn, exhibit a pronounced means-based strain.
in the organization's size tend to mimic extant trends in income.

Trends
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Restructurings occurring while these trends in resources are decreasing
are least likely to be associated with successes.

Additionally,

success-related restructurings tend to arise from nonconflictual
catalysts and to involve more elements.
CORE’s Unique Correlations
In addition to the common correlations above, CORE and SNCC each
display some unique relationships among the variables.

The following

section highlights relationships among the variables which appear only
for CORE.

METRIC SCORE is positively correlated with both TIME TO FIRST

ELEMENT (r=.41) and TOTAL TIME (r=.45).

For those changes that took

longer than the mean total time to complete, the average metric score
was 0.6.

Restructurings completed faster than the mean time averaged a

metric score of -2.6.

Although longer time is associated with earlier

restructurings (r=-.45) and a higher metric score is also related to
earlier restructurings (r=-.43), this relationship between time and
metric score is not merely an artifact of YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS.
The relationship is just as obvious after April 1964, when everything
was happening much more quickly.

For this later period restructurings

taking longer than the mean time show an average metric score of 1.6,
while those restructrings faster than average exhibit a mean metric
score of -2.4.

Regardless of when the restructuring occurs within

the organization's chronology, ends-based restructuring takes time.
Conversely, at least for CORE, means-based restructurings enhanced
speed.
EXTERNAL CATALYSTS are negatively related to the METRIC SCORE
(r-.32) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r— .34, TOTAL TIME
r=-.37).

This makes sense since it is saying that internal catalysts
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tend to produce restructurings that take longer and, as noted before,
longer restructurings tend to have higher metric scores.

Internal

catalysts initiated restructurings with a mean metric score of 0.5,
while external catalysts led to changes averaging -2.4 on the metric.
Again this is not merely an artifact of the year, for after April 1964
internal catalyst restructurings averaged -0.3 while externally
initiated ones display a mean metric score of only -2.2.

With relation

to time, restructurings begun by internal catalysts took an average of
52 weeks to complete (36 after April 1964), while external catalysts
were answered by restructurings that took only 21.7 weeks (20.4 weeks
after April 1964).

Changes in response to external catalysts, then,

are more means-based and are completed much more quickly than their
internally generated counterparts.
RELATIVE SIZE also is negatively related to METRIC SCORE (r=-.26)
and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.36, TOTAL TIME r=-.27).
The average metric score is -3.3 for restructurings occurring while size
was increasing, whereas the average metric score for restructurings that
occurred while size was decreasing or maintaining is 0.1.

During times

of flourishing membership, CORE restructured primarily within relatively
fixed ends and focused its transformations on its activities and
resources.

It is when the trend in membership was either static or

declining that CORE brought its domain and task structure more pointedly
into question.
Restructurings that occurred while size was increasing took an
average of only 33.3 weeks to complete;
maintaining were completed in 56.9 weeks;

those occurring while size was
and during periods of

decreasing size the average length of restructuring was 75.8 weeks.
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Overall this is saying that restructurings were completed much faster in
the early 1960's than at any other time in CORE's history.

The

disparity between the strengths of the correlations with TIME TO FIRST
ELEMENT and TOTAL TIME indicates that it was the reaction time from the
catalyst to the onset of restructuring more than the actual time to
transform the elements once restucturing began that was most severely
affected by the relative size.

As size increased CORE reacted more

readily to the relevant catalysts than it did while size was decreasing
or maintaining.

In short, CORE restructured its elements more quickly

in the early 1960's, but these correlations also show that a significant
part of the decrease in total time was a result of more immediate
reaction to appearing catalysts.
SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is also negatively related to the METRIC
SCORE (r=-.28) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.54,
TOTAL TIME r=-.45).

Remember that for CORE the SCOPE OF THE

RESTRUCTURING is regarded as an organizational rather than
variable.

Therefore this

restructuring

is just reaffirming that earlier

restructurings have higher metric scores and take longer to complete.
Again the disparity within the correlations for the time measures
indicates that relevant catalysts
in CORE's history as they

were not responded to as quickly early

were inlater years.

In addition to these unique correlations for CORE seen in Table 7a,
Appendix C shows two additional relationships.

CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS

are negatively correlated with EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (r=-.24) and
positively with SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING (r=.30).

Since SCOPE OF THE

RESTRUCTURING is basically an organizational variable, this is stating
that conflictual catalysts occurred later in CORE's history.
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The relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and EXTERNAL
CATALYSTS was discussed briefly above.

Internal catalysts were more

likely to be conflictual than were external ones.
all CORE's catalysts were conflictual.

Overall only 20% of

Twenty-three percent of all

CORE's internal catalysts were conflictual, while only seven percent of
the external catalysts can be classified as involving conflict.

CORE's

later restructurings were more frequently in response to conflictual
catalysts than its earlier changes, but even here CORE is changing in
response to internal conflict rather than to disputes involving the
external environment.

Since unanswered catalysts do not formally enter

this study, it is difficult at this point to say if CORE actually
experienced very few conflicts with the broader social world, or if it
did encounter many of these externally conflictual episodes but did not
readjust its organizational configuration in response to these disputes.
In addition to the correlations shared with SNCC, then, CORE
displays the following relationships.

Means-based restructurings are

completed more quickly than ends-based changes.

A trend of increasing

size, a larger score of the restructuring, and an external catalyst are
all associated with these relatively quick means-based changes.

Finally

conflictual catalysts most frequently are generated within the
organization and occur later in the group's history.
SNCC's Unique Correlations
SNCC displays fewer unique correlations than CORE.
positively related to the NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (r=.27).

METRIC SCORE is
Similar to the

effect noted in the relationship between NUMBER OF ELEMENTS and SUCCESS,
this correlation is statistically created due to an outlier effect.
one-element forms of restructuring,

For

the mean metric score is -2.3, and
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for two-element forms it is -3.0.

In contrast, three-element forms show

a mean metric score of 1.0 and four-element forms average 2.5 on the
derived metric.

For the majority of the cases (i.e., those involving

one or two elements), the larger the number of elements, the lower the
metric score.

By including all restructurings, though, the drastic

disparity between the mean metric scores for one- and two-element forms
compared to three- and four-element changes points to a slight
correspondence between extensive changes and ends-based strains.
Although the statistical finding is partly artificial with this sample,
the fact that it is such a dramatic difference warrants its inclusion in
the findings.

Perhaps a sample with more three- and four-element forms

will provide a normal distribution which could clarify this point.
Later restructurings are less apt to be related to successes
(r=-.32).

The six restructurings associated with successes occurred

during the first three years, or eighteen restructurings, of SNCC's
history.

This also makes sense because SUCCESS is additionally

correlated with other variables (less CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS, higher
RELATIVE SIZE, and higher RELATIVE INCOME) which are themselves
associated with an earlier year.

This points once again to the early

1960s as the prime era for the achievement of successes.
CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS are negatively correlated with RELATIVE SIZE
(r=-.39).

As size decreased conflictual catalysts increased.

An

increase in conflictual catalysts preceded a decrease in size, pointing
to the previously mentioned relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS
and RELATIVE INCOME.

Conflictual catalysts are slightly more

significantly tied to a decrease in income, which is then followed by a
decrease in the size of the constituency.
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An EXTERNAL CATALYST is positively related to the RELATIVE SIZE
(r=.23).

Only 18% of the restructurings associated with a decrease in

relative size had an external catalyst.

For restructurings occurring

while size was maintaining or increasing, though, the increase is
significant:

39% of those occurring during periods of maintaining size

and 50% of those occurring while size was increasing sprang from
external catalysts.

In proportional terms a restructuring that occurred

during a period of growth in the constituency was most likely to be
preceded by an external catalyst.

In reality the majority (ten of

sixteen) of external catalysts occurred during the long phase of
constancy in size.

It is, therefore, the very few external catalysts

during the final period of decline rather than numerous external
catalysts during periods of growth that is surfacing here,
RELATIVE SIZE is also negatively related to the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION
(r=-.47).

Again this is reflecting the predominance of problematic

disjunctions as size is decreasing.

With the transition from a trend of

increasing size to a phase of stable size in late 1964, the proportion
of restructurings with problematic disjunctions increased.

However, it

was not until mid-1966, when size began to steadily and consistently
decline,

that problematic disjunctions became the mode--occurring in 62%

of the restructurings.

A similar pattern is seen in relation to

RELATIVE INCOME (r=-.43).

Since a decrease in income preceded a

decrease in size, and a decrease in size preceded the predominance of
problematic disjunctions,

it seems appropriate to conclude that as SNCC

began to disintegrate with regard to resources, changes within the
organization became more problematic.

Problems were occurring which the

organization could not control, and internally there was less consensus
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on how things should change.
SNCC's unique restructurings add the following relationships to the
total picture of the organization's history.
early in SNCC's history.

Successes occurred

Those restructurings involving three or four

elements leaned toward more ends-based changes.

And, as SNCC's size

decreased it responded to less external catalysts, more conflictual
catalysts, and had more problematic changes in the first element of its
restructurings.
Common Correlations with Changes in the Elements
In addition to looking at relationships among the central
variables,

it is potentially informative to delineate correlations

between changes in each of the individual elements and these central
variables in order to illuminate the conditions in which each particular
variable changed.

For this analysis changes in each element are coded

dichotomously:

1 if the element changed in a given restructuring and 0

if it did not.

This section will focus on only those relationships

which are significant for both CORE and SNCC.

(Correlation coefficients

are provided in Appendix C .)
A change in activities is negatively correlated with CONFLICTUAL
CATALYSTS (CORE r =-.35, SNCC r=-.21) and positively related to RELATIVE
SIZE (CORE r=.22, SNCC r=.38) For CORE a conflictual catalyst never
resulted in a change in activities.

For SNCC 23% of restructurings

preceded by conflictual catalysts produced changes in activities, but
this is still an under-representation of changes in A compared to its
overall incidence.

During periods when size was increasing, 54% of

CORE's restructurings and 75% of SNCC's changes involved a change in
activities.

Conversely, when size was decreasing only 28% of CORE's and
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18% of SNCC's restructurings involved a change in this element.
Therefore, changes in activities are most likely to occur in
restructurings responding to nonconflictual catalysts and during trends
of increasing size.
A change in resources is positively correlated with the TYPE OF
DISJUNCTION (CORE r=.33, SNCC r=.42) and the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING
(CORE r=.24, SNCC r=.22).

Interpretations of these correlations must

proceed cautiously because R was such a frequently changed element,
especially for SNCC, that it occurred in the majority of restructurings,
regardless of other variables.

SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is again an

organizational variable for CORE, and therefore a positive relationship
here is pointing to the fact that changes in resources occurred most
frequently later in CORE's history.

For SNCC there is a significant

difference, though, between the involvement of resources in over 70% of
the regional and national restructurings and in only 40% of the local
restructurings.
For CORE 82% of restructurings with problematic disjunctions
involved a change in R while only 45% of non-problematic disjunctions
brought resources into play.

For SNCC all problematic disjunctions

involved R in the restructuring.

However, only 43% of all changes in

resources had problematic disjunctions.

A problematic first element

change is a sure indicator that resources were involved in the
restructuring;

however, a change in resources does not necessarily

imply a problem with the first element.
Resources, then, were often involved in restructurings which had a
problematic change in the first element and affected a broad geographic
area.

Not only were resources involved in these restructurings with
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problematic disjunctions, but in the majority of these cases resources
was actually the first, and therefore the problematic, element.
Resources change profusely throughout the histories of CORE and,
especially, SNCC.

The current correlations reveal that these changes

were most frequent later in the groups' histories, and that resources
were most often changed during this period in the form of a sudden loss
of either money or a usable constituency rather then as a calculated and
planned change within the organization.
Changes in the task structure display no common correlations across
CORE and SNCC;

however, domain is positively correlated with SUCCESS

(CORE r = .39, SNCC r-.22) and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (CORE r=.23, SNCC
r=.20).

External catalysts led to a disproportionate amount of changes

in domain:

36% of CORE's external catalysts and 38% of SNCC's were

answered, in part, by a change in D.

Also slightly over half of all

domain changes occurred in response to external catalysts.

Therefore,

although the majority of external catalysts did not involve a change in
D, this element most frequently changed in response to an external
catalyst.
Approximately half of all restructurings associated with successes
involved a change in domain.

This is in contrast to less than 30% of

all restructurings which involved such a change.

For CORE this means

that 66% of all domain changes were somehow associated with successes,
but for SNCC only 27% of the changes in domain were so involved.

The

relationship between success and a change in domain, therefore, is
unclear.

The role of domain changes appears more crucial when it is

recognized that three of CORE's four causal linkages between
restructurings and instances of success, and two of SNCC's three such
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linkages involve a change in domain.

These causal linkages involving

domain are evenly distributed among restructurings which preceded,
occurred coterminously with, or followed an instance of success.

So

while changes in domain are over-represented in success -related
restructurings, the value of domain changes for encouraging successes or
the effect of success on realigning the organization's goals or focus is
unclear.
In short changes in activities occur most frequently during
periods of growth and in response to nonconflictual catalysts.

Changes

in resources are abundant throughout CORE's and SNCC's histories.
However,

they occur most frequently in later years and often involve a

problem with the element rather than a calculated decision to change.
Finally, domain changes most frequently occur in response to an external
catalyst and are, in some unclear way, linked to the attainment of
success.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE GENERALIZABILITY OR KREPS' THEORY AND CONCLUSIONS

If Kreps' theory and the applications of it are illuminating
characteristics of organization sui generis rather than of groups in
specific substantive contexts, findings from different substantive areas
should display some convergence.

Not all findings from disaster studies

have a relevant counterpart in other social settings.

Variables from

previous research using Kreps' theory such as Scope of Impact, Length of
Forewarning, and others clearly are applicable in the disaster setting
but are irrelevent in other non-disaster-related forms of association
and organization.

However, the more strictly organizational variables

are relevant to all structural configurations.

If the findings of

previous disaster-related research point to relationships that do not
appear in other contexts, the best that can be said of the theory is
that it is applicable only in disasters, and the worst would be that
previous research has somehow been significantly flawed so that
documented relationships have little relationship to actual events.

It

is important, then, not only to examine the possibility of using the
theory to study organizations outside of disasters, but also to compare
the findings from these disaster- and non-disaster-related analyses to
test the theory and to grasp the dynamics of organization itself.
For Kreps'

(1985) variables that are relevant to CORE and SNCC, the

correspondence between previous findings and the current research point
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to relationships that can be generalized outside the disaster setting.
Of course, we are still dealing in an analysis of social movement
organizations with extra-normal organizations.

To more persuasively

document the generalizability of both earlier findings and the current
findings, it will be necessary to look not at the margins of
conventional society, but directly into the structural and
organizational forms of common existence.

Perhaps there ;Ls^ something

structurally unique about forms of association that are created to
change an aspect of the existing environment, whether the change is seen
as an attempt to return to "normal" (as in disasters), or if it is an
attempt to change what exists and to move on to a new "normal" (as in
social movement organizations).
peculiarities.

This research cannot point to such

Only through more research on conventional organizations

can such anomalies be exposed and can more universal relationships be
asserted.
Moving back in the life histories of the organizations for a
moment, Saunders and Kreps (1986) and Bosworth and Kreps (1986) discuss
the origins system state.

According to the logic of the origins metric

(Kreps, 1985a) CORE's pattern of origins (R-A-D-T) is scored -1, while
SNCC's D-R-T-A origins configuration receives a score of +2.
origins, then, CORE was more oriented to means, or action,
SNCC.

In

than was

According to the earlier studies in disaster, a greater degree of

action at origins is associated with less means based restructuring at
maintenance.

These previous findings are substantiated here with CORE's

more action-driven origins (metric score of -1) paired with less
means-based restructuring (mean metric score of -0.8).

In turn SNCC's

more order-driven origins (metric score of +2) is linked to a greater
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degree of means-based restructuring (mean metric score of -2.0).
Neither CORE nor SNCC exhibits a pattern of predominantly ends-based
restructuring, however CORE and its action-driven origins period is
significantly less oriented toward means-based restructurings than is
the order-driven SNCC.
Kreps also found that the more complex the social network of the
organization at maintenance, the greater the degree of means-based
restructuring.

CORE, with its higher average metric score, was linked

to an average of 1.2 other organizations at the time of each
restructuring, while for the more means-based SNCC the organization
displayed three inter-group links at the time of each restructuring.
For CORE the correlation between the total number of links and the
metric score is -.27, clearly indicating that there was a tendency for
more means-based restructurings to occur when the organization was
linked to a larger number of other units.

Although this relationship is

still negative for SNCC, it is neither significant nor sizable.
Looking at the actual mean metric scores for those restructurings
which occurred while the organization was linked to a small number of
other groups (one or two) compared to when it was involved in a more
complex social network (links with three to five other groups), the
relationship between a complex social network and means-based changes is
apparent, as is the reason for the disparity in correlation strengths.
CORE's restructurings with few links have a mean metric score of 0.04,
while those which occurred in conjunction with a larger number of links
have an average metric score of -3.2.

Part of this disparity can be

attributed to the higher metric scores of earlier restructurings when
CORE also had fewer links to other organizations.

However, looking at
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only the 1960's the difference is still evident, although it is not so
extreme.

In this later period restructurings with few links had a mean

metric score of -1.5, while those with more links show an average score
of -3.0.
For SNCC, the relationship is evident, but it is much less clear.
Restructurings which occurred when the organization had fewer links show
a mean metric score of -1.6, while those with more links had an average
metric score of -2.2.

This slight difference is further clouded by the

fact that the majority (9 of 11) of restructurings with a metric score
above the mid-point were also associated with a more complex social
network.

Also, slightly more of the restructurings which occurred

during periods when SNCC had a complex social network display metric
scores above the mid-point.

There is, then, a slight tendency for

restructurings occurring during periods of more complex social networks
to have lower scores for SNCC, but it must be remembered that the
majority of ends-based restructurings also occurred in conjunction with
more complex social networks.
The current findings tend to support Kreps' original finding.
There does seem to be a pattern here, but it is not an unambiguous
relationship.

Looking at SNCC as the organization with a more complex

network, it is true that, overall, more inter-organizational links are
associated with a stronger means-based orientation.

This is the

dimension and unit of analysis employed in Kreps1 previous work, so I am
confirming what he found.

Looking within SNCC's history, though, there

seems to be reason to doubt whether the links the organization maintains
at the time of a particular restructuring are significantly related to
the means-ends strain of the change.
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A final finding from Kreps is that a larger size is related to a
greater degree of means-based restructuring.
is equivocal.

Support for this finding

CORE was a much larger organization than SNCC in terms of

formal constituency, but it was less means-based in its average
restructuring than SNCC.

Another way of testing this previous finding

is to see if periods of increasing size are related to more means-based
changes.

For CORE this is clearly the case as seen in the negative

correlation between RELATIVE SIZE and METRIC SCORE (r=-.26).

SNCC,

however, shows no significant relationship between these two variables.
The most supportive finding is in the correlation between ABSOLUTE SIZE
of the organization (i.e., number of people in active constituency) at
the time of each restructuring and the METRIC SCORE (CORE r=-.45, SNCC
r=-.34).

Here both CORE and SNCC clearly show that a larger

constituency is related to means-based changes.

This final relationship

reinforces Kreps' original finding that the larger the organization, the
more means-based the restructurings.

However, this finding pertains to

individual instances of restructuring, not to the entire history of a
group, and the relationship between periods of growth and the means-ends
strain of relevant changes remains unclear.
The current work can lend further support to Kreps'

(1985) finding

that a greater degree of order at origins is related with a greater
degree of means-based restructuring at maintenance.

With the above

qualifications in mind, research on CORE and SNCC can also support the
finding that a more complex social network and a larger size of the
organization are associated with a greater degree of means-based
restructuring.
If findings from the current work reflect organizational patterns
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rather than merely patterns of social movement organizations, they
should also show some similarity with Linn's (1986) initial study of
organizational restructuring in the disaster context.

As with all

disaster-related research, the temporal parameters of the organizations
in this previous project were much shorter than CORE'S and SNCC1s.

In

Linn's work it was found that means-based restructurings are most
prevalent.

The current work can certainly support this.

Linn's mean

was -3.5 for his sample of disaster related restructurings, and his
median was -4.

In the current work both CORE and SNCC display average

metric scores leaning towards means-based restructuring.

CORE'S median

is slightly higher than Linn's finding at -1, but SNCC's median is -4,
the same as in the previous research.
In addition to this predominance of means-based forms, Linn found
that the majority of restructurings involved very few elements.
restructurings he uncovered in disaster-related organizations,
one- or two-element forms.

Of the
67% were

This predominance of less extensive

restructurings is even more apparent in CORE and SNCC, in which fully
88% of all restructurings involved only one or two elements.
Linn also found that the greater the degree of the restructuring
(i.e.

greater number of elements changed) the higher the metric score.

More specifically he found that one- through three-element forms tended
to be means-based while complete four-element restructurings showed a
strain toward ends.

In SNCC a similar pattern is found.

However, for

this organization both three- and four-element forms show a strain
towards ends.

The relative consistency in mean metric scores across

CORE'S one- to three-element changes also lends partial support to this
previous finding.

While the current work cannot fully either support or
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refute Linn's finding,

it does apear that less extensive restructurings

are means-based and that there may be a tendency towards ends in more
extensive changes.

However, the specific number of elements at which

the switch from means-based to ends-based forms prevail is not clear.
Other than the strain toward means, the findings are far from decisive.
Finally, Linn found that means-based restructuring does not
necessarily enhance speed.

In my research the METRIC SCORE and TOTAL

TIME OF RESTRUCTURING are positively correlated for CORE, but are not
significantly related for SNCC.

This means that for CORE means-based

change does enhance speed, while for SNCC the means-ends slant of the
restructuring makes little difference with regard to speed.

I cannot

say, then that means-based restructuring undeniably enhances speed.

I

can say, though, that during periods of predominantly means-based
changes total times of restructurings are much shorter.

When changes

are occurring very rapidly and frequently, means-based restructuring
predominates.

However, specific instances of means-based restructuring

are not necessarily faster than individual ends-based changes.
The current analysis of CORE and SNCC can lend some support to
earlier disaster-specific findings, and therefore suggest a degree of
generalizability for both the theory and these previous conclusions.

A

strain towards order in the origins system state is associated with a
greater degree of means-based restructuring at maintenance.

There is

also some support for the assertion that a more complex social network
also corresponds to more means-based changes, at least in the overall
history.

The relationship between a larger size of the unit and

means-based restructurings also receives some confirmation, but in this
case it holds true with regard to individual changes rather than total
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histories.
As in the previous study of restructuring, a clear dominance of
means-based and less extensive forms is displayed by CORE and SNCC.

The

relationship between a higher metric score and more extensive changes is
tenuous, and the specific parameters of this relationship are unclear,
but the current findings hint at the possibility of such a pattern.
Finally in CORE and SNCC increased speed is not unequivocally tied to
means-based changes, but it is clearly associated with periods in which
means-based restructurings predominate.

CONCLUSION

CORE and SNCC display very similar patterns of restructuring across
their entire histories.

An initial period of ends-based changes during

which the task structure of the organization is repeatedly defined gives
way to a period of almost exclusively means-based restructurings.

It is

during this means-based phase that most successes are achieved.
Immediately following a setback in usable income, the organization once
again brings its structural ends into question, and a mixed period of
restructurings commences.

This final mixed phase lasts until, on a note

of ends-based change, the group transforms to a smaller enclave of
militant members.
Earlier restructurings are enacted in response to less conflictual
catalysts and are, themselves, relatively unproblematic.

These earlier

changes take a longer time to complete and affect a smaller geographic
area.

It is also during this earlier phase that income is most

consistently increasing.

Although the relationship between trends in
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size and the calendar year are different for CORE and SNCC, trends in
the size of the constituency mimic existing trends in income.
Irrespective of the chronological placement of a restructuring, those
changes with a non-problematic transition in the first changing element
tend to be less means-based.
With regard to the achievement of success, several relationships
emerge.

Restructurings which occur while income and size are steadily

increasing or holding constant are much more likely to be associated
with an instance of success than changes that occur when resources are
decreasing.

Additionally, changes that result from a nonconflictual

catalyst and which call into play more elements are more frequently
linked to the achievement of success.
Findings for coterminous time periods show that the 1960's were a
time of very rapid and means-based change for these groups.

The first

four years of this decade encompassed a series of almost exclusively
means-based changes and the majority of all successes.

After temporally

similar setbacks in income, the groups both entered phases during which
ends-based changes were interspersed among the frequent means-based
restructurings.

Finally, within a year of each other both groups

transformed into small cadres of militant members.
With such apparent consistencies for coterminous time frames,
Goldstone's (1980) critique of Gamson's original work on protest groups
must be kept in mind.

Perhaps, as Goldstone asserts, there are periods

during which broader societal variables are such that success is much
easier to achieve.
early 1960's.

It could be that this is what is occurring in the

In addition, perhaps these external events and forces are

not important just with regard to successes;

perhaps they are also key
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in determining the life histories of social movement organizations
overall.
The limited time span during which most successes are achieved, the
transitions between and the duration of subsequent phases, the patterns
within these phases, and the temporally similar demises of CORE and SNCC
all bring into question the importance of organizational variables and
dynamics versus the influence and importance of larger society factors.
It seems that both organizational and larger world phenomena are
influential in these groups.

While the external variables are indeed

crucial and intertwined with many of the current findings on CORE and
SNCC, there is also evidence throughout these findings of organizational
patterns which are apparently independent of the encompassing time frame
or external environment.

While many questions remain unanswered, the

current research can only state these relationships as they appear,
without conjecture about the explanation behind them.

This task of

separating temporally coterminous findings from independent structural
relationships can be advanced only in more extensive research on a
variety of social movement organizations.
Kreps' structural theory has shed some light on the patterns and
relationships of CORE and SNCC, both as representatives of social
movement organizations and as organization sui generis.
research, in turn, has illustrated that Kreps'
substantive areas other than disasters.

The current

theory can be employed in

The convergence between

findings from these social movement organizations and previous
disaster-related findings also suggest that Kreps' theory has uncovered
some aspects of organization in general rather than just
disaster-related organizations in particular.

Most of the difficulties
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and necessary revisions associated with employing Kreps'
discussed in Chapter Two.

theory were

Just a few issues which need to be kept in

mind for future research and for refining the theory will be presented
her e .
The definitions of the elements must be precise for each piece of
research.

The concepts are very precise analytically.

However the

theoretical integrity of the concepts is difficult to maintain across
the many judgment calls that are necessary in delineating
restructurings.

At present these operational terms are precise enough

to ensure fairly consistent delineations across subsequent
restructurings within a research project by a single researcher.

The

consistencies between current findings and previous research using
Kreps' theory also suggest that there is a degree of inter-researcher
agreement.

With each progressive addition to the research employing

this theory, though, the goal of more standard and explicit operational
definitions and boundaries for the elements should be attempted and,
hopefully, approached.
In this same vein, criteria of discontinuity between unique
restructurings need to be more precise.
a simple task.

Articulating these will not be

Discontinuities in time and space and unique catalysts

served as adequate guidelines in this research, but there are still
restructurings that it is possible to defend analytically as either
multiple-element changes or as strings of less extensive changes.
These refinements can come only with extensive research in a
variety of substantive areas.

To expand and test the viability of the

theory itself, research into forms of association and organization in
all spheres of the social realm is necessary.

With regard to the
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current work, only through research on a broad sample of social movement
organizations can the present uncertainty about the generalizability of
the findings and the independent effects of external and structural
variables be clarified.
We need to work toward increased operational precision and to
explore social phenomena in diverse substantive areas.

Consistency

among the completed research projects suggests that to a large degree
the collective representations of these elements and of the points of
discontinuity between restructurings are fairly well developed.

With

each subsequent application of Kreps1 theory such definitions and
boundaries should become more clarified and specified.

As with all

social phenomena, theories must always be conceived as both extant
entity and ever-evolving process.

Only by recognizing both the

underlying constancy of a framework and the ever-present potential for
revision and improvement can a given theory and the field of sociology
progress.
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NOTES
1) "System state" refers to Dubin's (1978) definition of the term.
It
is an analytical entity in which (1) all units of the system have
characteristic values, (2) these values are all determinant, and (3) the
constellation of unit values persists through time (1978;144).
While it
is very helpful, this definition obviously does not facilitate precise
delineations of separate system states.
Questions concerning the
thresholds of change for unit values and the duration which constitutes
"time" remain to be grappled with by the individual theorist.
Kreps has
chosen to designate only three system states--origins, maintenance, and
suspension--within his theory. A case could clearly be made that the
restructurings I am analyzing are not only reformulations of the
organization but that each actually signifies a transition to a new
system state.
By choosing to place all forms containing all four
elements within one system state, Kreps is allowing for some fluctuation
of the values for each element while maintaining that as long as all
four are present in some configuration, organization exists.
Kreps'
designation of system states can therefore be thought of as
"pre-organization" (origins), "organization" (maintenance), and "demise
of organization" (suspension). The current work focuses on the second
system state --maintenance. The origins system state is introduced only
briefly, and suspension is not considered.
2) To present the relevant sources here and minimize distractions during
the upcoming historical chronologies, bibliographical paragraphs are
provided for each CORE and SNCC in place of in text citations. The
principle sources for documenting the history of CORE were Meier and
Rudwick's (1973) comprehensive history of CORE, James Farmer's (1965)
discussion of the organization and its focus, and Farmer's (1985)
autobiography.
Inge Powell Bell's (1968) sociological analysis of CORE
was also informative.
The microfilm edition of the CORE Papers was
useful for filling in the gaps left by secondary sources.
Shorter
pieces by Rudwick and Meier (1969), McKissick (1968), and many others
provided specific bits of information to the gradually evolved picture.
Of central importance in tracing SNCC's history was Carson's (1981)
analysis of the group's evolution.
Zinn's (1964) coverage of the group,
and Sellers' (1973) exposition provided valuable information, but the
focus of these works did not always remain on central historical facts.
Jim Forman's (1972) tome on SNCC provided both valuable insight and a
rather precise chronology.
Various other works such as Carmichael and
Hamilton's (1967) demand for Black Power, Stoper's (1977)
interpretations of the group, Sutherland's (1965) compilation of Freedom
Summer communications, and Matusow's (1972) history helped to complete
this picture.
For both groups numberous general histories of the civil rights
movement added crucial points and a clearer synthesized picture of the
groups' lives and position in the larger picture.
3) While this lack of internal satisfaction with externally noted gains
is crucial to SNCC's ensuing history, it is not directly linked to any
restructuring.
This brings to the front a point worthy of note:
The
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current theory (or any strictly structural analysis) can document the
course of an organization.
However in a "redemptive organization"
(Stoper, 1977), such as SNCC, a successful comprehension of its history
requires the incorporation of non-structural dimensions as well.
The
current analysis can accurately document SNCC's changes.
To understand
these changes, though, requires a very subjective type of explanation
that is not even attempted here.
This incompleteness does not cripple
the current analysis;
for the purpose of this study, and all research,
is to augment existing knowledge, not to render previous research
unnecessary.
4) This analysis of CORE and SNCC is specifically interested in the
generalizability and applicability of Kreps' theory, but a few words
about the difficulties of documenting successes must also be mentioned.
Like with many restructurings, successes often appear as the culmination
of an elongated period of gradually increasing gains. As in
restructurings, such trends in success are documented when they pass a
threshold of observability.
More than with regard to restructurings,
the problem of previous author's selective inclusion of successes
plagues the research.
Gamson's criteria included collective
representations of various factions to delineate successful groups.
This inter-reporter consistency is also relied on less formally in the
current work.
However in delineating individual instances of success
rather than overall gains, such convergence by a full range of sources
is often not possible in each case.
Successes for SNCC are particularly difficult.
Its largest gains
were arguably in consciousness raising--a category not included in the
current research.
Even more difficult, SNCC considered many of the
gains attributed to it by others to be insults or testimony to the
remaining enormity of the task before them rather than as crucial
accomplishments.
Finally, two of the group's primary gains were
achieved under the formal banners of COFO and the MFDP.
In my view both
COFO and the MFDP were basically pseudonyms for SNCC at the time of
these gains, so the successes can be assigned to SNCC.
Distinctions
such as these decrease clarity, but it is by struggling with such
delineations that a better grasp of "success" as a concept is
concretized.
5) It is noted that TOTAL TIME is very highly correlated with TIME TO
FIRST ELEMENT.
This relationship is saying that there is a very strong
relationship between the lag from the catalyst to the initiation of
restructuring and the total time from the catalyst to the last
restructuring element.
Because the second of these variables
encompasses the first, this is primarily an artifactual relationship.
In addition, with the large number of one-element forms, the fact that
both CORE and SNCC have a correlation of .89 on this measure means very
little.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE LABELS

ITEMS

COLUMNS
1-3_____

CASE I.D.
DATE STARTED

MONTH ___
00 = UNCERTAIN

4-5_____

DATE STARTED

Y E A R ___
00 = UNCERTAIN

6-7_____

DATE COMPLETED

MONTH ___
00 = UNCERTAIN

8-9_____

DATE COMPLETED

Y E A R ___
00 = UNCERTAIN

10-11_____

CONTINUED AS TREND

1 = YES
0 = NO
9 = UNCERTAIN

FORM OF RESTRUCTURING 01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

= D
= T
33
R
34
= A
35
= DT
36
= DR
37
= DA
38
= TD
39
= TR
40
= TA
41
- RD
42
= RT
43
= RA
44
= AD
45
= AT
46
= AR
47
= DAT
48
= DAR
49
= DTR
50
= DTA
51
= DRT
52
= DRA
53
= TRD
54
= TRA
55
= TDA
56
= TDR
57
= TAR
58
= TAD
59
= RDA
60
= RDT
61
= RAT
62
= RAD
63
64 = ARTD

12_____

13-14
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
«
=
=
=
=
=
=
==
=

RTD
RTA
ATR
ATD
ART
ARD
ADR
ADT
DTRA
DTAR
DRAT
DRTA
DATR
DART
TRAD
TRDA
TADR
TARD
TDRA
TDAR
RADT
RATD
RDTA
RDAT
RTDA
RTAD
ADTR
ADRT
ATDR
ATRD
ARDT

106

CATALYST

1
2
3
4
0

=
=
=
=
=

BENIGN/INTERNAL
BENIGN/EXTERNAL
CONFLICTUAL/INTERNAL
CONFLICTUAL/EXTERNAL
UNCERTAIN

15

DISJUNCTION

1
2
3
0

=
=
=

CHANGE
INTRA-EL. DISPARITY
CONTINGENCY
UNCERTAIN

16

TIME: CAT - 1

WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN
888 = N/A

17-19

TIME: 1 - 2

WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN
888 = N/A

20-22

TIME: 2 - 3

WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN
888 = N/A

23-25

TIME: 3 - 4

WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN
888 = N/A

26-28

TOTAL (CAT - LAST)

WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN
888 = N/A

29-31

TOTAL (1 - LAST)

WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN
888 = N/A

32-34

CHANGE IN DOMAINS

0
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
COORDINATE
LOCATION
NONVIOLENCE
MEMBERSHIP
EMPHASIS

35
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SPECIFIC D CHANGE

00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

- N/A
= COORD./ FEDERATE
= NORTH
= SOUTH
= NORTH (FUNDS)
= DEEP SOUTH
= NATIONAL
= INTERNATIONAL
= URBAN
= NONVIO (PHIL.)
= NONVIO (TACTIC)
= END OF NONVIO
= ANTI-COMMUNIST
= FREE ASSOCIATION
= ALL-BLACK
- INTERRACIAL
= DIRECT ACTION
= VOTER REGISTRATION
= COMMUNITY ORGANIZING
- PARTISAN POLITICS
= POOR BLACKS
(INCLUDES 1 MAN, 1 VOTE)
21 = ANTI-WAR
22 = BLACK POWER
23 = PARAMILITARY
24 - COORDINATE LOCAL UNITS

36-37

ADDITIONAL D
CHANGE

SEE CODES ABOVE

38-39

CHANGE IN ’

00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
40-41______
COORDINATING COMM.
INCREASE OF POSITIONS AT NATIONAL OFFICE
DECREASE OF POSITIONS AT NATIONAL OFFICE
INCREASE IN POWER OF ONE SEGMENT
DECREASE IN POWER OF ONE SEGMENT
INCREASE IN # FIELD POSITIONS
DECREASE IN # FIELD POSTITONS
DIVISION OF EXISTING POSITIONS
(INCLUDES CREATION OF BRANCHES)
= CHANGE OF POSITION TO SIMILAR POSITION
= CREATION OF NEW GOVERNING BODY
= WHO SHOULD LEAD?
= SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES
- FEDERATION OF LOCAL UNITS

ADDITIONAL T CHANGE (SEE CODES ABOVE)

42-43
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CHANGE IN R

00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

ADDITIONAL R
CHANGE

SEE CODES ABOVE

CHANGE IN A

00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

ADDITIONAL A CHANGE

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
-

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
44-45
INCREASE MEMBERSHIP
DECREASE MEMBERSHIP
ADDITION OF KEY INDI V I D U A L S )
LOSS OF KEY I N D I V IDUALS)
CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES
DISPERSION OF RESOURCES
INCREASED STAFF
DECREASED STAFF
INCREASE IN WHITE STAFF
DECREASE IN WHITE STAFF
INCREASE IN INCOME
DECREASE IN INCOME
INCREASE IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT
DECREASE IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT
INCREASED DEDICATION OF STAFF
DECREASED DEDICATION OF STAFF
CLOSING OFFICES
FIRING STAFF
RADICALIZATION OF STAFF
46-47

N/A
48-49
START DIRECT ACTION
INCREASE DIRECT ACTION
DECREASE DIRECT ACTION
END DIRECT ACTION
START VOTER REGISTRATION
INCREASE VOTER REGISTRATION
DECREASE VOTER REGISTRATION
END VOTER REGISTRATION
COMMUNITY O R G . - EDUCATION
COMMUNITY ORG.
- URBAN
COMMUNITY ORG.
-GENERAL
NATIONAL PROJECT
START PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES
INCREASE PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES
DECREASE PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES
POLITICS -- PARTISAN
POLITICS -- EXTRA-PARTISAN
DECREASED ACTIVITY
INCREASED ACTIVITY - FIELD
INCREASED ACTIVITY - FUND RAISING
COORDINATE PROTESTS
EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
RADICALIZING ACTIVITIES
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

SEE CODES ABOVE

50-51
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SCOPE OF
RESTRUCTURING

1 = LOCAL
2 = REGIONAL
3 = NATIONAL

52

POST-RESTRUCT.
SCOPE OF
ORGANIZATION

1 = LOCAL
2 = REGIONAL
3 = NATIONAL

53

SIZE (RELATIVE)

0
1
2
3

=
=
=

UNCERTAIN
DECREASING
MAINTAINING
INCREASING

54

SIZE (ABSOLUTE)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

UNCERTAIN
50 OR LESS
51 - 100
101 - 200
201 - 500
501 - 1000
OVER 1000

55

MONEY (RELATIVE)

0
1
2
3

=
=
=
=

UNCERTAIN
DECREASING
SAME
INCREASING

56

MONEY (ABSOLUTE)
(CONTRIBUTIONS
PER YEAR)

1
2
3
4
5
9

=
=
=
=
=
=

0 - $10,000
$10,001 - $50,000
$50,001 - $100,000
$100,001 - $500,000
OVER $500,000
UNCERTAIN

57

CONSTITUENCY (RACE)

0
1
2
3

=
=
=
=

UNCERTAIN
58
INTERRACIAL (INCLUDES PREDOM. WHITE
PREDOM. BLACK
ALL-BLACK

CONSTITUENCY (CLASS) 0
1
2
3

=
=
=
=

UNCERTAIN
PREDOM. MIDDLE CLASS
MIXTURE
PREDOM. WORKING/LOWER CLASS

59

LINKAGES--VEP

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

60

LINKAGES--COFO

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

61
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LINKAGES--MFDP

0 - NO
1 - YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

62

LINKAGES--OTHER CIVIL 0 = NO
RIGHTS (EXCLUDES
1 - YES
COFO, V E P , AND MFDP 9 = UNCERTAIN
ALLIANCES)

63

LINKAGES--NON-CIVIL
RIGHTS

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

64

LINKAGES--NON-CIVIL
0 = NO
RIGHTS (COMMUNIST) 1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

65

TOTAL LINKS (LOCAL)

66

# (NUMBER)

TOT LINKS (REGIONAL) # (NUMBER)

67_

TOT LINKS (NATIONAL) # (NUMBER)

68_

ANTAGONISTS:
LOCAL
SEGREGATIONISTS

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

69_

ANTAGONISTS:
LOCAL
OFFICIALS

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

70_

ANTAGONISTS:
NATIONAL
SEGREGATIONISTS

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

71_

ANTAGONISTS:
NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

72_

ANTAGONISTS:
POWER
STRUCTURE

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN

73_

DIPLACEMENT GOALS

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN/UNCLEAR

74_

CENTRALIZATION

1 = DECENTRALIZED
2 = COMBINATION
3 = CENTRALIZED

75

Ill

PHILOSOPHY:
NONVIOLENCE

0
1
2
3
9

PHILOSOPHY:
INTER-RACIAL

NO
BEING QUESTIONED
AS TACTIC
YES(PHILOSOPHY)
N/A

76

0 =
1 =
9 =

NO
YES
N/A

77

PHILOSOPHY:
WORK ITSELF

0 =
1 =
9 =

NO
YES
N/A

78

PHILOSOPHY:
TOWARD BLACK
CONSCIOUSNESS OR
SEPARATISM

0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = N/A

79

PHILOSOPHY:
BLACK POWER

0 - NO
1 = YES
9 - N/A

80

METRIC SCORE

BETSY'S METRIC

=
=
=
=
=

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15

= -7
-6
= -5
= -4
= -3
= -2
= -1
- 0
- +1
=
+2
= +3
= +4
= +5
= +6
= +7

81-82

03
04
05
06
07

=
=
=
=
=

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1

83 -84_

08
09
10
11
12
13
00

=

0

= +1
=
+2
= +3
= +4
= +5
= N/A

=

112

JOHN'S METRIC

06
07
08
09
10
00

“
=
=
=
=
=

-2
-1
0
+1
+2
N/A

85-86

ORIGINS METRIC

05
06
07
08
09
10
11
00

=
=
“
=
=
=
=
=

-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
N/A

87-88

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS

(NUMBER)
0 == N/A

89

COMPLEMENTARITY

0 == NO
1 == YES
9 == N/A

90

NO
YES
UNCERTAIN

IN DEBT

IS RESTRUCTURING
RELATED TO A
SUCCESS

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SUCCESS CASE I.D.

(NUMBER)
000 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS
(MONTH)

91

= NO
92
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
“CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
=COTERMINOUS ONLY
=COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
“ IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
“CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
“IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
“UNCERTAIN
93-95

96-97
00 = N/A
98-99

DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)
00 = N/A
SCOPE OF SUCCESS

1
2
3
0

=
=
=
=

LOCAL
REGIONAL
NATIONAL
N/A

100

113

LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS:
ALONE OR WITH OTHERS

1
2
3
4
0

=
=
=
=
=

ALONE
101
INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL
N/A

VEP

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
102
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

COFO

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
103
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

MFDP

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
104
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
105
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

NON-CIVIL RIGHTS

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
106
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

ACTIVITIES PRECEDING
SUCCESS

0
1
2
3
8
9

=N/A
= DIRECT ACTION
= VOTER REGISTRATION
= EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
= OTHER
= UNCERTAIN

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES
PRECEDING SUCCESS

SEE CODES ABOVE

107

108

114

TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE

0
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=

N/A
CONSULTATION
NEGOTIATION
FORMAL RECOGNITION
INCLUSION

109

RELEVANT ANTAGONIST

0
1
2
3
4
5
9

=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
LOCAL OFFICIALS
NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
POWER STRUCTURE
UNCERTAIN

110

TYPE OF ADVANTAGES

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=

N/A
VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
OTHER

ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES

SEE CODES

ENFORCEMENT OR
NEW REGULATION

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
113______
ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
CREATION OF NEW LAWS
COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION
UNCERTAIN

DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE

0
1
2
3
4
9

=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
114
NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
CONCESSION
IMPORTANT GAIN
CRUCIAL GAIN
UNCERTAIN

SUCCESS OCCURS DURING
ORIGINS

1 = NO
2 - YES
3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING
0 = N/A

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN
PLACE (FOR THOSE
OCCURING DURING
ORIGINS ONLY)

ABOVE

(NUMBER)
0 = N/A

111______

112______

115

116

115

IS RESTRUCTURING
RELATED TO
ANOTHER SUCCESS

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SUCCESS CASE I.D.

(NUMBER)
000 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS
(MONTH)

= NO
117
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
=CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
=COTERMINOUS ONLY
=COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
=CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
=IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
=UNCERTAIN
118-120

121-122
00 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)

123-124
00 = N/A

SCOPE OF SUCCESS

1
2
3
0

=
=

LOCAL
REGIONAL
NATIONAL
N/A

125

ALONE OR WITH OTHERS

1
2
3
4
0

=
=
=
=
=

ALONE
INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL
N/A

126

VEP

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
127
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

COFO

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=

N/A
128
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

MFDP

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
129
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS:
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OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS

0
1
2
3
9

=
=

N/A
130
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

NON-CIVIL RIGHTS

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=

N/A
131
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

ACTIVITIES PRECEDING
SUCCESS

0 =N/A
1 = DIRECT ACTION
2 = VOTER REGISTRATION
3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
8 = OTHER
9 - UNCERTAIN

132_

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES
PRECEDING SUCCESS

SEE CODES ABOVE

133

TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE

0
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
CONSULTATION
NEGOTIATION
FORMAL RECOGNITION
INCLUSION

134

RELEVANT ANTAGONIST

0
1
2
3
4
5
9

=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
LOCAL OFFICIALS
NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
POWER STRUCTURE
UNCERTAIN

135

TYPE OF ADVANTAGES

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=

N/A
VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
OTHER

136____

ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES

SEE CODES ABOVE

ENFORCEMENT OR
NEW REGULATION

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
-

137___

N/A
138___
ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
CREATION OF NEW LAWS
COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION
UNCERTAIN
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DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE

0
1
2
3
4
9

SUCCESS OCCURS DURING
ORIGINS

1 = NO
2 = YES
3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING
0 = N/A

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN
PLACE (FOR THOSE
OCCURING DURING
ORIGINS ONLY)

=
=
=
=
=
=

N/A
NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
CONCESSION
IMPORTANT GAIN
CRUCIAL GAIN
UNCERTAIN

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SUCCESS CASE I.D.

(NUMBER)
000 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS
(MONTH)

140

_ (NUMBER)
0 = N/A

IS RESTRUCTURING
RELATED TO
ANOTHER SUCCESS

139

141

= NO
I MMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
=IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
=CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
=COTERMINOUS ONLY
=COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
I MMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
=CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
I M M E DIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
=UNCERTAIN

142

143-145

146-147
00 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)

148-149
00 = N/A

SCOPE OF SUCCESS

1
2
3
0

=
=
=
=

LOCAL
REGIONAL
NATIONAL
N/A

1
2
3
4
0

=
=
=
=
=

ALONE
151
INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL
N/A

150

LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS
ALONE OR WITH OTHERS
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VEP

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
-

N/A
152
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

COFO

0
1
2
3
9

=
-

N/A
153
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

MFDP

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=

N/A
154
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
«

N/A
155
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

NON-CIVIL RIGHTS

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=
=

N/A
156
NO
INFORMALLY LINKED
FORMALLY LINKED
UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

ACTIVITIES PRECEDING
SUCCESS

0 -N/A
1 = DIRECT ACTION
2 = VOTER REGISTRATION
3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
8 = OTHER
9 = UNCERTAIN

157

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES
PRECEDING SUCCESS

SEE CODES ABOVE

158

TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE

0
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=

N/A
CONSULTATION
NEGOTIATION
FORMAL RECOGNITION
INCLUSION

159

RELEVANT ANTAGONIST

0
1
2
3

=
=
-

N/A
LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
LOCAL OFFICIALS
NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS

160
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4 - NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
5 = POWER STRUCTURE
9 = UNCERTAIN
TYPE OF ADVANTAGES

0
1
2
3
9

ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES

SEE CODES

ENFORCEMENT OR
NEW REGULATION

0
1
2
3
9

=
=
=
=

N/A
163______
ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
CREATION OF NEW LAWS
COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION
UNCERTAIN

DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE

0
1
2
3
4
9

=
«
=
=
=

N/A
164
NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
CONCESSION
IMPORTANT GAIN
CRUCIAL GAIN
UNCERTAIN

SUCCESS OCCURS DURING
ORIGINS

1 = NO
2 = YES
3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING
0 = N/A

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN
PLACE (FOR THOSE
OCCURING DURING
ORIGINS ONLY

= N/A
161______
- VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
= PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
= HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
= OTHER
ABOVE

(NUMBER)
0 = N/A

162______

165

166

120

APPENDIX B: THE CHRONOLOGIES OF CORE AND SNCC
Complete Chronology of CORE'S Restructurings and Successes
With Specific Changes in Elements and Gains
Date of
Restructuring
or Success
June 1943

Form of
Restructuring
or Success
D-T

Specific Changes in Elements
or Type of Success

D:Geographic scope of organization
expanded to national. "The purpose
of this organization shall be to
federate local interracial groups
working to abolish the color line
through nonviolent direct action."
T:Loose federation of local chapters.
Officer positions included chairman
and combination secretary/treasurer.

June 1944

T:Executive Committee created.
Officer
positions expanded to include three
vice-chairmen.

June 1945

T:Executive Committee no longer primary
policy-making body. Council, which
was composed of the executive committee
plus two representatives from each chapter,
was created and became policy-making
unit.
Officer positions now shifted to
include a chairman, one vice-chairman,
a secretary, treasurer, and executive
secretary.

April 1947

A:Direct action project by national group in
the form of the Journey of Reconciliation.

June 1947

T

T:Field representative position created.

June 1948

T-R

T:Second field representative position
created.
R:Manuel Talley selected to fill this second
field representative position.

June 1948

D

D:Statement on Communism drafted which
formally stated that Communist-controlled
groups could neither join nor be retained
as a part of CORE.

June 1949

T:Increased field positions to include
six field representatives. Increased the
strength of the Council and abolished
the Executive Committee.
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1950

June 1951

A-R

T-R-A

A:Initiation of trend of
decreasing amounts of direct action
proj ects.
R:Trend of declining membership and
number of active units.
T:Created positions of part-time fund
raiser and full-time field worker.
R:James Robinson appointed as fund raiser.
A:Increased active pursuit for contributions,

January 1954

R-T

R:Resignation of Houser as executive
secretary.
T:Duties of executive secretary divided
into three positions. Field worker
position abolished.

June 1954

R

R:Benchmark of upward trend in income.

March 1956

T

T:National Action Committee created as
new central body.

September 1956

R

R:Promotion of James Robinson to
executive secretary position.

1957 - 1960

December 1957

October 1959

T-A-D

Advantage

T

February 1960July 1960

A-T-R

October 1960December 1960

R-T

T:Creation of two field worker positions
in the South.
A:Added voter registration and enforcement
of school desegregation as central
types of action.
D:Expanded geographic area of influence
to include the South.
Passage of Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs Bill,
a New York City fair-housing law
T:Created positions in public relations
and special fund raising.
A:Increased activity of field workers in
the South. Sympathy protests proliferate
in North.
T:Created three more field secretary
positions and post of field director.
R:Student advisors brought in. Increase
in number of new units being formed.
Bulk of workers and funds shifted to
the South.
R:Ousted James Robinson as Executive
Secretary.
T:Eliminated position of Executive Secretary
and created new post of National
Director.
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February 1961

R

A:Resurgence of a national project in
the Freedom Rides.

May 1961

June 1961

June 1961April 1962

September 1961

R:James Farmer assumed new National
Director position.

Acceptance:
Consultation
D-A

Advantage

Meeting with Kennedy to discuss voter
registration.
D:Voter registration part of
legitimate focus rather than just
another activity.
A:Intensified activities in voter
registration.
Interstate Commerce Commission Order
which banned segregation on facilities
concerned with interstate travel.

October 1961

R

R:Marvin Rich promoted to fund raiser
position.

October 1961October 1962

R-T

R:Demarcates initiation of trend of
rapidly growing membership.
T'.New position created--Assistant to
National Director. National Action
Council replaced National Action
Committee and National Council. Field
secretaries became responsible for
specific geographic areas.

April 1962October 1963

A-R-D

A:Focusing on discrimination in
employment and housing.
R:Marks end of concentration of resources
in the South. Demarcates initiation of
a trend of more blacks and especially
working class blacks joining organization.
D:Beyond integration to the problems
of the black poor.

J une 1962

Advantage

Baltimore City Ordinance barring
segregation in public accommodations
following the Route 40 Freedom R ide.

August 1962

Advantage

Desegregation of substantial portion
of Howard Johnson and Holiday Inn
chains in North Carolina from
Freedom Highways campaign.

December 1962

Advantage

Preferential hiring agreement from
Sealtest Dairies Co. following
two month boycott.
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April 1963July 1963

R-A

R:Increased number of people joining
CORE, and current members becoming
more active.
Financial support increased
A:More direct action projects incorporating
more radical techniques. Increase in
profusion of direct action temporary,
but increase in radicalization marks
commencement of a trend. Radicalization
included courting arrests, civil
disobedience, and emphasis on ghetto
improvement.

June 1963

R

R:Floyd McKissick appointed as National
Chairman.

April 1964

A

A:Marks recognition of a declining trend
the importance and profusion
of direct action projects.

April 1964

R

RrDecreasing contributions, combined with
history of over-spending, placed
CORE in debt.

June 1964

T

T:Five Regional Action Councils created.

June 1964June 1965

A-D

A :Involvement in partisan politics
to oppose Goldwater's nomination as
a presidential candidate.
D:Partisan politics as part of legitimate
focus.

August 1964

R

R:Resignation of Norman Hill as program
director.

September 1964

Advantage

Benchmark for Gains in Voter Registration
in the South.

October 1964

A-D

A:Marks benchmark of an increasing
emphasis on community organizing
D:Community Organizing--focusing on
the felt needs of the community.
Freedom and equality rather than
integration became central focus.

October 1964January 1965

T-R

T:Creation of Associate National
Director position.
R:George Wiley named to this new
p ost.

January 1965

R

R:Response to rising debt:
Acquired loans and developed CORE
Scholarship, Educational, and Defense
Fund as sources of support for
programs.
Closed some offices;
streamlined the staff and programs

in
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of those that remained open.
June 1965

T:Formal declaration that members of the
minority community "shall substantially
constitute the leadership" of the chapters

September 1965

AiVirtual end of voter registration
in deference to previously noted
increasing trend in community organizing.

J anuary 1966

R

R:Change in National Director from
Farmer to Floyd McKissick.

March 1966

R

R:Substantial loss of staff.

June 1966

D-R

D:Endorsed Black Power rhetoric. Discarded
commitment to nonviolence. Adopted
an anti-war statement.
R:Many white supporters turned away from
CORE.

June 1968

R-D-T

R:Roy Innis replaced McKissick as National
Director.
Smaller staff and fewer
chapters.
D:Black nationalism rather than civil
rights. Formally excluded whites from
becoming members.
T :Fewer staff positions arranged in more
centralized configuration.
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Complete Chronology of SNCC's Restructurings and Successes
With Specific Changes in Elements and Gains
Date of
Re s true tur ing
or Success

Form of
Re s true tur ing
or Success

Specific Changes in Elements
or Type of Success

June 1961

R-D

R:Received a grant from the SCEF,
an organization that was popularly
viewed as communist-oriented. Hired
Bob Zellner with this grant.
D:Assertion of the group's prerogative
of Free Association.

June 1961

T-R

T:Created field worker position.
R:Charles Sherrod hired to fill this
position.

July 1961August 1961

R-A

R:Bob Moses broke his ties with
the SCLC and became a full-time
SNCC worker.
A:Moses and two students began voter
registration in Mississippi.

August 1961September 1961

D-T-A-R

D:Formally shifted emphasis
to include both direct action and
voter registration as part of
SNCC's focus rather than as the
responsibility of local college groups.
T:Two wings established--voter registration
and direct action--with coordinators for
each. Executive secretary position created
to coordinate things from Atlanta.
A:Involving local Mississippi blacks in
direct action rather than relying on
college students to do the protesting.
R:Jim Forman selected as Executive Secretary,

September 1961October 1961

R-D-A-T

R:Twelve students dropped out
of college to become full-time
SNCC workers.
D:Shifted sphere of influence from
college campuses of entire South
to the rural Deep South--Operation
MOM (March on Mississippi).
A:Community organizing.
T:SNCC policy made by actions of
field staff. Coordinating
committee became more of a titular
head.
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December 1961June 1962

T-R

T:Created new positions: full-time
secretary, communications director,
administrative assistant, and
publicity and public relations.
R:Key people introduced to fill these
posts (e.g., Julian Bond, Dotty
Miller, Ruby Doris Robinson).

February 1962

T

T:Formalized emphasis on the
primacy of local leadership as
seen in a proposal to the Voter
Education Project.

April 1962

R

R:Benchmark for trend of increasingly
radical band of workers. New members
likely to be involved in movement
before joining and older members
becoming radicalized by their experiences
in the Deep South.

April 1962

T

T :Coordinating Committee re-oriented
to include representatives from each
group rather than each state.
Executive Committee created to carry
out policies between conferences.

June 1962December 1962

D-R

D:North designated as principal
area of fund raising.
R:Two white Northerners hired to
direct these efforts.

October 1962

A

ArDirect aid project in form of
LeFlore County food drive.

December 1962

R

R:Benchmark of trend of increased
income from Northern fund raising
operations.

June 1963

R

R:John Lewis elected as

July 1963

September 1963November 1963

February 1964

Advantage

D-R-A

A

chairman.

Designates significant increase in
the number of black Mississippians who were
registered to vote due to SNCC's efforts.
Still only approximately 5% of eligible black
voters were registered.
D:"One man, one vote."
R:One hundred student volunteers
from Stanford and Yale came to
Mississippi to assist SNCC.
A:Freedom Vote.
A:Freedom Registration.
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April 1964

A-R

A:Expanded Northern operations to
develop alliances and raise funds for
proposed Summer Project.
R:Increased income.

May 1964June 1964

R-A

R:Shifted resources to Freedom Summer
project areas of Mississippi. Influx
of Northern college students as volunteers
for the Summer.
A:Intensified existing projects and
activities. Began new activities such as
Freedom Schools.

August 1964

Acceptance:
Inclusion

September 1964

Advantage

September 1964

R

MFDP challenge at Democratic
convention resulted in offer of
two seats with no voting rights and promise
to bar representatives from discriminating
states at next convention.
Marks increase in registered
voters on both Mississippi registrars' formal
lists and in the unrecognized MFDP following
the intensified efforts of Freedom Summer.
R:Eighty of the Summer volunteers decided
to remain in Mississippi and become full
time SNCC workers rather than return to
school.
A:First instance of SNCC-sponsored
international travel: eleven members toured
Africa.

September 1964

October 1964

R

R:Benchmark for trend of eroding
support from Northern liberals.

October 1964J anuary 1965

R-A

R:Staff not dependable or performing
their jobs well. "Freedom high" faction
developed who valued personal freedom more
highly than adherence to any organizational
goals.
A:Closed a portion of the Freedom Schools and
community centers established in the Summer
due to this undependable staff.

February 1965

T:Field staff demanded formal votes
for themselves within the organization.
They then voted themselves onto the
coordinating committee. Secretariat created
to make decisions between executive
committee meetings.

March 1965

A:Beginning of activities in Lowndes County.

June 1965

A

A:Partisan politics in an urban area in
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conjunction with Julian Bond's campaign for
the Georgia House of Representatives.
December 1965

R

R:Benchmark for declining trend
in contributions. SNCC no longer received
significant contributions from institutional
sources, and individual contributions were
steadily decreasing.

January 1966

D

D:Formal statement against U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.
This is the first
instance of expanding the group's legitimate
scope beyond domestic racial issues.

January 1966

A

A:Initiation of the Atlanta Project
(a group of urban organizers who were
authorized by SNCC to build local community
support for Julian Bond).

May 1966

R-T

R:Stokely Carmichael elected chairman after
a contested re-election of John Lewis.
T:Ten-member committe created to replace the
executive committee. Declaration that whites
should work in the white community and
blacks in the black community.

May 1966

A

A:Beginning of a series of trips to
foreign countries.

J une 1966

D

D :Black Power.

June 1966

R

R:Resignation of John Lewis.

July 1966

A-R

A:Many projects not being carried
out because staff members not doing their
jobs .
R:Fired some of the ineffective staff and
closed some offices.

October 1966

R-D

R:Benchmark for a discernible shifting
of staff from rural projects to urban areas.
D:Emphasis on these urban areas as the
legitimate focus of SNCC's activities.

November 1966

R-A

R:A11 Lowndes County staff, except
Rap Brown, left their posts after the
November election.
A:End of previously active Lowndes County
project. Signifies virtual end of voter
registration.
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December 1966Hay 1967

D-R

D:Formal declaration of an
all-black organization.
R:Loss of white staff. This was seen most
distinctly in SNCC’s refusal to officially
support Bob and Dotty Zellner's work in
New Orleans.

February 1967

R

R:Fired Atlanta Project staff.

May 1967

R-D-T

R:Rap Brown elected to replace
Carmichael as chairman.
D:Expanded legitimate focus to international
arena with declaration of the group as a
"human rights organization."
T :Established an international affairs
commission.

July 1967

R

R:Loss of most remaining
contributions from white supporters
following publication of a pro-Palestinian
article by a SNCC member.

June 1968

R-T

R:Rap Brown's series of arrests
made it impossible for him to be an
effective chairman.
T:Replaced the position of chairman with
nine deputy chairmen.

July 1968

R

R:Carmichael expelled.

December 1968

R

R:Cleveland Sellers and Willie Ricks
fired.

June 1969

D-R-T

D:Redefined focus as a paramilitary
group.
R:Resignation of Jim Foreman.
T:Rap Brown in position of titular leader,
but control of the organization actually
was in the hands of the newly created
Revolutionary Political Council.

130
ID
>

in
T—
>

cd

tp

00
CN
•

*—
>

co
T—
>

CN
r—
>

CORE— Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations

in
•

r—

>

CN
•

Tp
•

tp

o
T—
•

00

o•
1

00
CN
•

CO
CN
•
1

CO
o
•

CD
CO
•

r-~
o
•

CO
o
•

CO
CN
•

CN
C"
•

O
tP
•

ID
tp
•

o
CN
•
1

CO
•
I

o
CN
•
1

in
Tp
•
I

CN
•
1

CN
•

o•

CN
O
•
1

o

ID
•
1

00
CO
•
1

o

00
T—
•
1

CO
CN
•
1

(N
r—
•
1

CN
co
•

tp

in
o•

CN
co
•

CD
O
•

m
CO
•
1

m

ID
T—
•

<T>
t"•

©
CO
•

o
r—

CN
•
1
TP

i

i

CO
CN
•
1

in•

uo
tp
•

i

l

00
co
•
I

in
o•

00
o•
1

CD
r—
•
1

00
CN
•

CN

ID

•

•

00
•

CN
CO
•

in
CN
•

VO
CN
•

i

1

tp

CN

i

o
>

o
t—
•

<y>
>

«D
O

ID
CN

ID
CO

1

1

1

o
t—

CN
CO

CO

,—

O

1

in
CN
•

o
•

•

CN
O
•

O
V
r—
•
1

CN
a—
•
1

o
CN
•
1

o
a—
•
I

CN CN
CN Tp
• •

TP
o
•

CN
CN
•
1

TP
CN

in o
tp m
• •

CN
o•

CO
co
•

TP
CN
•

in o

CN
CN
•

CD
a—
•

ro•
i

VD
O
•

cn

CO
Tp
•

vo
a—
•
1

<D>
1—

o
o•

00
on
i
n• i
•

CN
<—
•
1

o
o•
T_

CO
o
•
1

CO
o•

00
TP
•

•

1

m m
• •

rCO TP
• •

CN

o
o in
CN Tp
•

•

’

o
o•

00 ID
O 00
• •
CN

«r-

M M
> >

g
n
o

00

>

•

•

•

•

1

r-

>

ID

>

m

>

tp

>

co
>

CM
>

Tp
r—

1
00
o•
1

m
CN
•
1

o
o•

o
o•

1

r—

i
n
TP

0>
00•

o
o•
,—

•

•

tp

•

co

f—

■
l

CN

•

CN
i—
a

l

i
n
Tp
•

CO

o
o•

o
•

o
in•
I

ID
O
•

1

in

1

r

TP
T—
•

rco
•

•

1

1

ro
r—
•

•
1

•
i

CN

o•

CN
CN
•

tt

CN

TP
CN

CN

•

•

00
CO

•

•

•

1

o

CO
•

o•

CO
O
•
1

•

o
o•

1

T—

TP
CN

o
o•

o r-

r~

CN

r- CD
•

cn

cn o

r-~-

CO Tp
• •

m o

p» Tp
• •
<- ID

in in

VD 00
VO• CD•
oo co
a- p • •

r- co

m iin• r»•
r_

•
>

•
*3*
>

> >

in o
CN CO
• •
oo rin

O

o•
,—

o
o•

CO

>

o o
(N TP
• «

o
o•

o
o•
r_

•
>

>

* •

© Tp
co in

CN

> > >

•

CO TP

o•

•
>

to u U CJ u
n II II 11 II II
— CN CO TP m iD

in oo

o

>

Cl.
O ta w ta w
w o
o
U g
Z o
2 o
ZZ

•
m
>

•
ID
>

•
>

•
00
>

•
>

CD

•
o
r—
>

•
r—
>
a—

•
CN
a—

>

>
A*
Q

c
cc
O' -P
s w

8 s
it n ii n II II II II
> > >

in vO
CO
> > > >

131
ID
•

00

rID
•

CN

00

in
>

00
TT

Tt
>

00
Tt

m

•

CN

co

in

ID

>
CN

>

SNCC— Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations

cn
in•

•

CN

•

•
1

Tt
•
1

CN

00

•
1

•

ID
O
•

CN
CN

o

•
1

o

•
1

r^
o

T—
•

o

•
1

CN

O

in
o

cn
o

tt

in
o

CN

00
o

t-

o
o

o

cn
i

in

1

I

CN

ro

t—
•
1

•

ID
CN

•
1

•

r-**

o

CN

CN
o•

00
o•

ID
•

o

CN

ID Tt
CN TT

ID
o

00

O

in
o

TT

O

ID Tt
CN Tt

i

o

CN

CN

tt

tt
cn

oo
o

ID
CN
•

CN
CN
•

ID
O
•

CN
Tt
•

CN
CN
•

t- 10
r- Tt
• •

CN

cn
o

00
CO

TT

o

ID
TT

co cn

i
m
o

i
ro

CO

CO Tt

i
o

m
ro

CO

Tt

CO
Tt

o o

o

Tt C"-

i
CN

Tt

Tt

o
o

CO Tt

l

K K W
o o

Cu Qu
O
>

oo

cn

CN

o

•

«—
•

O
*—
•
1

ro
•

o

•
1

0
o0

co
Tt

Tt

O

00
ID

c
n
co

CO
CN

O
O

co
o

o
o

o
o

co

o
o

r-

in

in
<3*

Tt

o

O
in

•

O
O

CO CN

00 00

CO V

U (J O

CO 00
cn id

1

co

>

in
o•

CN

CO

r—

r—

•

1

1

r>

CO
•

ID

<n

>

•

ID
O
•

•

o

CN

oo

oo cn
CO Tt

i
o
CN

CN

in

CN
CO

CN
CO

o
O

r-

CO Tt

i
uo
>

rCN

Tt

>

CO

>

co

o

Tt

ID
cn
o

cn

p-

o

cn
co

o
o

co

o
o

o
i

o

o

o
o

CO

CO Tt
p» in
• •
CN CO
T” *"
Tt
VD ID
Tt •
• CN

cn
CN

>

r^CN

tn
cn• in•
tn CO

o
o

o
o

•
>

CN CN
ID 00
• •
r—

•
CN
>

•
CO
>

•
Tt
>

co u

m

•
m
>

»
ID
>

•
r*
>

•
00
>

•
cn
>

•
o
r—
>

•
r_
>

•
CN
r—
>

c
to
St
S

II II II

II II II II

f-cNOTtmiDr^co

> > > > > > > >

132

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Jeffrey C.
1982 Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Volume One:
Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Allen, Robert L.
1970 Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic
History. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company.
Bell, Inge Powell
1968 CORE and the Strategy of Nonviolence. New York: Random
House.
Blaustein, Albert P. and Robert L. Zangrando
1968 Civil Rights and the Black American: A Documentary History.
New York: Washington Square Press.
Bosworth, Susan L. and Gary A. Kreps
1986
"Structure as Process: Organization and Role." American
Sociological Review 51: in press.
Carmichael, Stokely
1970
"What We Want." in Peter I. Rose, ed. Old Memories, New
Moods. New York: Atherton Press, Inc. 237-46.
Carmichael, Stokely and Charles V. Hamilton
1967 Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America.
New York: Vintage Books.
Carson, Clayborne
1981 In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Chafe, William H.
1980 Civilities and Civil Rights. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Dubin, Robert
1978 Theory Building. New York: The Free Press.
Farmer, James
1965 Freedom--When? New York: Random House.
Farmer, James
1985 Lay Bare the Heart. New York: Arbor House.
Forman, James
1972 The Making of Black Revolutionaries. New York: The Macmillan
Company.

133

Francis, Patricia R. and Gary A. Kreps
1984 "Disaster and the Social Order: Organization and Social
Network." Unpublished paper.
Freeman, Jo
1979
"Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing
Social Movement Organization Actions." in M.N. Zald and
J.D. McCarthy, e d s . The Dynamics of Social Movements.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.
Gamson, William A.
1975 The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, Illinois:
The Dorsey Press.
Gamson, William A.
1980 "Understanding the Careers of Challenging Groups: A
Commentary on Goldstone." American Journal of
Sociology 85: 1043-1060.
Goldstone, Jack A.
1980 "The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson's
The Strategy of Social Protest." American Journal of
Sociology 85: 1017-1042.
Good, Paul
1970 "Odyssey of a Man--and a Movement." in August Meier and
Elliott Rudwick, eds. Black Protest in the Sixties.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 252-66.
Killian, Lewis M.
1984 "Organization, Rationality and Spontaneity in the Civil
Rights Movement." American Sociological Review
49: 770-783.
Killian, Lewis M.
1975 The Impossible Revolution, Phase II.
House.

New York: Random

Kreps, Gary A.
1985a Structural Sociology, Disaster, and Organization.
Unpublished Monograph.
Kreps, Gary A.
1985b "Disaster and the Social Order." Sociological Theory 3:
49-65.
Linn, John R.
1986
"Disaster and the Restructuring of Organization."
Master's thesis. College of William and Mary.

134

McKissick, Floyd B.
1968
"Programs for Black Power." in Floyd B. Barbour, ed.
The Black Power Revolt. Boston: Extending Horizons
Books. 179-181.
McLaughlin, Barry, ed.
1969 Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological
Perspective. New York: The Free Press.
Matusow, Allen J.
1972 "From Civil Rights to Black Power: The Case of SNCC,
1960-1966." in Barton J, Berstein and Allen J. Matusow,
eds. Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations.
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 494-520.
Meier, August
1963
"Negro Protest Movements and Organization." The Journal
of Negro Education 32: 437-50.
Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick
1973 CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick
1969 "How CORE Began." Social Science Quarterly 49:
Meier,
1970

789-99.

August and Elliott Rudwick
"Radicals and Conservatives: Black Protest in TwentiethCentury America." in Peter I. Rose, ed. Old Memories,
New Moods. New York: Atherton Press, Inc.

Miller, David L.
1986 Introduction to Collective Behavior. Belmont, California:
Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Morris, Aldon
1981
"Black Southern Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal
Organization." American Sociological Review 46: 744-67.
Morris, Aldon
1984 The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. New York: The
Free Press.
M u s e , Benj amin
1968 The American Negro Revolution: From Nonviolence to Black
Power, 1963-1967. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press.
Myers, Frank E.
1971
"Civil Disobedience and Organizational Change: The
British Committee of 100." Political Science Quarterly
LXXXVI: 92-112.

135

Oberschall, Anthony
1973 Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Oberschall, Anthony
1979
"Protracted Conflict." in M.N. Zald and J.D. McCarthy,
eds. The Dynamics of Social Movements. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.
Redding, Saunder
1969
"The Black Youth Movement." The American Scholar 38.4:
584-7.
Roberts, Gene
1970 "The Story of Snick: From 'Freedom High' to Black Power."
in August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, eds. Black Protest
in the Sixties.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Roberts, Ron E. and Robert Marsh Kloss
1974 Social Movements: Between The Balcony and The Barricade.
Saint Louis: The C.V. Mosby Company.
Samuels, Gertrude
1970 "Two Ways: Black Muslim and N.A.A.C.P." in August Meier and
Elliott Rudwick, eds. Black Protest in the Sixties.
Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 37-45.
Saunders, Sarah L. and Gary A. Kreps
1986
"The Life History of Emergent Organization in Disaster."
Currently under review.
Sellers, Cleveland with Robert Terrell
1973 The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant
and the Life and Death of SNCC. New York: Wiliam Morrow &
Company, Inc.
Sitkoff, Harvard
1981 The Struggle for Black Equality: 1954-1980. New York: Hill
and Wang.
Skocpol, Theda
1979 States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Smith, Jean
1968
"I Learned to Feel Black." in Floyd B. Barbour, ed.
The Black Power Revolt. Boston: Extending Horizons
Books. 207-18.
Sobel, Lester A.
1967 Civil Rights 1960-66. New York: Facts on File, Inc.

136

Starbuck, William H.
1983
"Organizations As Action Generators." American Sociological
Review 48: 91-102.
Stoper, Emily
1977
"The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee: Rise and Fall
of a Redemptive Organization." Journal of Black Studies
8: 13-34.
Sutherland, Elizabeth, ed.
1965 Letters From Mississippi. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
The Papers of the Congress of Racial Equality, 1941-1967.
Edition.

Microfilm

Useem, Bert
1985
"Disoganization and the New Mexico Prison Riot of 1980."
American Sociological Review 50: 677-688.
Von Hoffman, Nicholas
1964 Mississippi Notebook. New York: David White Company.
Wallace, Walter L.
1983 Principles of Scientific Sociology. New York:
Aldine Publishing Company.
Waskow, Arthur I.
1967 From Race Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960s. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Wood, James L. and Maurice Jackson
1982 Social Movements. Belmont, California: Wadsworth
Publishing Company.
Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash
1966
"Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change." Social Forces
44: 327-41.
Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy, eds.
1979 The Dynamics of Social Movements. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Winthrop Publishers, Inc.
Zangrando, Robert L.
1969
"From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: The Unsettled
1960's." Current History 59.339: 281-6.
Zinn, Howard
1964 SNCC: The New Abolitionists. Boston: Beacon Press.

VITA

Elizabeth M. Zeiders Farmer

Born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, February 12, 1962.
Carlisle High School, 1980;

B.A.

with concentration in Sociology;
and Mary, 1986.

Graduated from

College of William and Mary, 1984
M.A.

in Sociology College of William

